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The  Place  of 
Values 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 


PRESENTED  BY 

PROF.  CHARLES  A.  KOFOID  AND 
MRS.  PRUDENCE  W.  KOFOID 


REV.  G.  R.   MONTGOMERY,  Ph.  D, 


The  Place  of  Values 


AN  ESSAY  IN 

EPISTEMOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS 


BY 

REV.   GEORGE   R.   MONTGOMERY,  PH.  D. 
Author  of  "  Talking  English:' 


MCMIII 

G.   R.   MONTGOMERY,   PUBLISHER 

BRIDGEPORT,    CONNECTICUT 


Entered  according  to  AEi  of    Congress,  in  the  year  /no?, 

by  George  R.  Montgomery , 
in  the  office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington,  D.  C. 


Type  and  Press  of 
The  Joyce  &  Sherwood  Company 

Printers  and  Publishers 
Bridgeport^     Connecticut,     U.    S.    A. 


The  Place  of  Values 


INTRODUCTION. 

HE  two  words  worth  and  truth  seem  to  be 
independent  variables.  Although  we  be- 
lieve them  to  be  related  in  some  way,  they 
are  not,  at  least,  synonymous  in  our  minds. 
Our  question  is  :  What  relation  or  articu- 
lation is  there  between  values  and  truth? 
Hence  we  have  our  subject,  The  Place  of  Values.  By  way 
of  a  general  introduction  we  shall  inquire  why  the  sub- 
ject of  values  has  been  neglected  in  philosophy  and  why 
it  is  important.  Then,  as  a  historical  introduction,  we 
shall  briefly  glance  at  attempts  to  supplement  intellectu- 
alism,  finding  them,  I  think,  to  be  really  attempts  to  do 
justice  to  the  worth  side  of  life.  Our  main  question  we 
will  approach  from  the  epistemological  standpoint,  ask- 
ing what  are  the  elements  in  consciousness  and  what  is 
the  significance  of  the  analysis  into  subject  and  object. 
As  an  irreducible  element  in  consciousness — in  the  con- 
tent of  the  word  subject  where  the  antithesis  subject- 
object  is  used — and  in  the  counterpart  to  the  abstract  re- 
lationships which  are  best  represented  by  the  word  truth, 
we  shall  find,  I  believe,  the  place  of  values. 

Why  Values  Have  Been  Neglected. 

The  exclusion  of  values  from  the  domain  of  truth  was 
achieved  only  after  a  long  struggle.  Arguments  of  ex- 
pediency and  utility  had  so  hampered  the  quest  of  truth 
and  truth  was  so  much  more  effective  when  free  from  them 
that  even  ethics,  which  the  Greeks  had  founded  on  the 


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conception  of  the  good  (Prof.  Ladd's  Phil,  of  Conduct, 
Page  34)  sought  its  basis  in  something  less  variable  than 
values  and  developed  into1  a  system  of  truths.  In  fact 
truth  seemed  to  offer  itself  as  the  last  hope  of  minds 
looking  for  an  authority.  So  variable  an  element  as 
value  could  contribute  nothing  to  those  satisfied  with 
absoluteness  alone,  and  when  truth  seemed  able  to  inter- 
pret the  whole  of  experience  in  its  own  terms  it  was  sup- 
posed that  values  also  would  some  day  be  expressible  in 
terms  of  truth.  Furthermore  the  dictum  de  gustibus  non 
disputandum  est  precluded  any  attempt  to  treat  values 
scientifically.  Political  Economy,  whose  investigations 
lie  largely  in  the  realm  of  values,  as  quickly  as  possible 
reduced  values  to  mere  numbers,  to  the  dollars  and  cents 
which  the  buyer  is  willing  to  pay  (Commercial  theory  of 
values)  or  to  the  amount  of  toil  and  sacrifice  which  a 
thing  has  cost  the  seller  (Socialist  theory.  Pres  Hadley, 
Economics,  Page  91). 

Theology  used  to  furnish  an  opportunity  for  the  discus- 
sion of  values.  But  Theology  has  been  pushed  to  the 
wall  and  Philosophy  of  Religion,  which  has  been  substi- 
tuted for  it,  points  out  origins  and  relations  and  unities 
rather  than  values. 

The  net  result  is  that  values  have  been  painstakingly 
eliminated  from  all  sciences  and  have  not  come  to  their 
own  anywhere  else. 

Why   a  Treatment  of  Values  is  Important. 

It  is  important  — 

First,  because  although  truth  for  truth's  sake  is  a  motto 
which  we  would  not  reject  for  a  moment,  there  is  this 
value  element  in  our  life,  the  most  intense  element,  the 
most  personal.  It  includes  all  that  men  most  desire, 
and  it  cries  for  recognition  and  justification ;  or  else,  if 
it  be  a  fiction  and  a  fallacy,  then  an  entire  removal  be- 
cause it  disturbs  and  perverts  the  recognition  of  truth. 
Men  fight  against  determinism  because  the  value  of  their 
living  is  menaced.  Men  opposed  evolution  because  it 


seemed  to  take  away  the  value  in  their  existence.     We 

must  either  justify  or  eliminate  the  sense  of  values.   , _ 

Second,  It  is  very  well  for  the  truth-seeker  to  be  calm 
and  patient  and  not  to  worry  even  should  another  thous- 
and years  pass  before  the  value  of  existence  be  worked 
out.  Men  and  women,  however,  have  but  a  few  years  to 
live.  To-day  they  must  act,  and  the  question  of  ultimate 
values  demands  immediate  treatment.  It  cannot  be  post- 
poned. Thinkers  have  neglected  to  link  our  every  day 
interests  to  their  systems.  Our  conduct  will  not  wait  on 
their  success  in  attaining  reality; 

Third,  The  pessimistic  conclusions  of  some  of  our  most 
influential  thinkers,  even  though  we  feel  the  morbidity 
of  their  views,  are  an  additional  incentive  to  us  to  discuss 
values  and  their  place  in  our  thinking ; 
Fourth,  Perhaps  in  this  element  of  values  which  plays 
the  leading  part  in  our  life,  we  shall  find  the  clue  to  some 
of  our  philosophical  and  psychological  difficulties. 

Professor  Ladd  does  not  at  all  overstate  the  case  when 
he  says:  (Phil,  of  Conduct,  Page  195.)  "The  reconcil- 
iation of  man's  scientific  standards  and  his  judgments  of 
that  which  has  value,  is  the  imperative  and  most  difficult 
problem  of  this  age  beyond  all  other  ages. "  In  itself  the 
very  fact  that  philosophy  has  found  no  place  for  values, 
justifies  the  imperative  demand  for  their  treatment. 

SUPPLEMENTS  TO  INTELLECTUALISM. 
Religion  as  a  Supplement. 

We  take  up  the  supplements  to  intellectualism  as  a 
historical  introduction  to  our  subject  because  we  regard 
them  as  indirect  recognitions  of  the  importance  and  the 
place  of  values.  Among  the  various  supplements  to  in- 
tellectualism we  find  that  religion  has  always  furnished 
the  principal  practical  supplement.  Its  contents  are  made 
up  of  what  people  desire  and  of  that  which  appeals  to 
people.  Its  sincerest  devotees  are  little  affected  by  ver- 
dicts of  intellectualism.  It  is  the  scandal  to  scientific 
minds  that  exhorters  and  evangelists  make  no  appeal  to 

5 


logic  in  winning  adherents  and  even  contemn  speculation 
as  distracting  the  attention  from  that  which  is  more 
important. 

In  the  Christian  religion  for  instance,  for  the  practical 
propagation  of  the  "Gospel,"  the  chief  emphasis  has 
been  laid  on  such  things  as  the  sense  of  sin,  and  the  at- 
tractive power  of  Christ,  things  which  appeal  to  the  sense 
of  worth.  It  is  in  the  wake  of  the  movement  and  not 
ahead  of  it  that  there  has  arisen  the  discussion  as  to  the 
personality  of  Christ  and  the  logical  meaning  of  the 
atonement.  The  basis  of  religion  was  never  in  intellect- 
ualism,  although  the  latter  is  always  very  ready  to  take 
it  up  and  explain  what  its  basis  is.  Natural  Theology 
tried  to  rebase  it  on  reasoning.  Modern  Philosophy  of 
Religion  where  it  does  not  tread  in  the  path  of  Natural 
Theology  studies  it  as  a  phenomenon  among  other  phe- 
nomena to  be  accounted  for.  Neither  Natural  Theology 
nor  the  Philosophy  of  Religion  have  propagated  religion. 

Faith  as  a  Supplement. 

These  supplementary  movements  have  always  gone 
along  parallel  with  intellectualism,  in  different  periods 
taking  on  different  names.  One  which  has  had  the  widest 
range  centers  in  the  word  faith.  Sometimes  the  word  has 
set  the  heart  with  its  affections  over  against  the  mind  with 
its  knowledge.  This  has  been  derisively  called  the  Pec- 
toral Theology  or  theology  of  the  breast.  Sometimes  inner 
experience  has  been  set  over  against  outer  experience,  in- 
sights and  intuitions  over  against  reasoning.  For  in- 
stance Otto  Plieiderer,  recognized  as  the  leading  German 
follower  of  Hegel,  says:  "Religion  does  not  attempt  to 
explain  the  world  theoretically,  but  it  tries  to  set  right 
the  relation  to  the  world  of  the  feeling  and  willing  ego  or 
the  heart."  (Relig.  Phil.  2-651). 

Sometimes  faith  is  a  peculiar  sense  of  dependence  on 
the  world-ruling  might  "in  whose  hand  lies  our  weal  and 
woe."  We  may  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  in  such 
statements  the  important  element  is  not  in  the  "depend- 
ence" but  in  the  words  "weal  and  woe." 

6 


Some  assert  that  faith  is  a  special  revelation  or  a  spec- 
ial insight  vouchsafed  to  the  elect.  Some  find  a  basis  for 
faith  in  authority,  whether  the  authority  of  the  Vicar  of 
God,  or  the  authority  of  the  church  or  that  of  common 
experience.  Some  call  faith  an  "attitude  of  the  mind" 
favorable  to  the  apprehension  of  truth,  or  a  mystic  knowl- 
edge or  intimation  of  the  supernatural.  Faith  is  often 
openly  named  "belief  without  reason  or  against  reason," 
or  else  reason  is  discredited  in  the  hope  that  this  some- 
thing else,  namely  faith,  will  advance  in  credit.  Some- 
times it  is  shown  that  all  knowledge  has  "faith  ele- 
ments" and  therefore  the  particular  faith,  which  is  being 
advocated,  is  true !  A  recent  popular  form  of  the  faith 
doctrine  has  been  found  in  James'  "Will  to  Believe," 
while  in  Theological  circles  Luther's  associating  faith 
with  that  which  man  clings  to  and  trusts  to  is  finding 
wide  acceptance. 

Jowett,  who  may  be  taken  as  representing  the  Theol- 
ogy of  Feeling,  says:  " Logical  categories  may  give  as 
false  a  notion  of  the  divine  nature  in  our  age  as  graven 
images  did  in  the  age  of  the  Patriarchs."  In  every  use 
of  the  word  faith  there  is  an  attempt  to  fill  up  a  void  left 
by  truth. 

Practical  Philosophy. 

Of  a  less  distinctly  religious  character  is  the  distinc- 
tion between  Practical  and  Theoretical  Philosophy.  Kant 
made  the  Practical  Philosophy  a  code  of  conduct.  In 
recent  times  there  has  been  quite  a  tendency  to  find  it  as 
a  system  of  worths.  Wundt  says  in  his  Einleitung, 
(Page  7) :  "When  we  ask  for  the  object  of  Philosophy, 
we  find  two  objects;  one,  theoretical,  purely  intellectual, 
which  has  its  roots  in  the  struggle  of  our  reason  for  a 
unity  and  harmony  in  knowledge;  and  the  other,  practi- 
cal, which  belongs  to  the  feeling  side  (Gemuthsseite)  of 
our  soul  life  and  seeks  for  a  world-view  which  shall  sat- 
isfy our  subjective  desires."  We  may  by  anticipation 
mention  the  inherent  contradiction  in  Wundt' s  system 
found  in  the  fact  that  he  reduces  Practical  Philosophy  to 

7 


Theoretical  (Einleitung,  Page  38)  but  in  epistemology  he 
reduces  the  object  to  the  subject. 

One  phase  of  the  Practical  Philosophy  is  to  emphasize 
"what  ought  to  be"  as  against  "what  is."  Sidgwick, 
for  instance,  ("Phil.,  its  Scope  and  Relations,"  Page  94) 
sets  off,  first  the  ethico-political  system  of  what  ought  to 
be,  and  over  against  this  he  puts  the  science,  or  the  posi- 
tive system  of  what  is.  He  defines  Theology  as  con- 
cerned with  showing  the  relation  between  the  two. 

The  Spirit-Sciences. 

In  certain  philosophical  circles,  especially  in  Germany, 
the  whole  of  the  old  contention  in  behalf  of  Theology, 
of  faith,  and  of  the  Practical  Philosophy,  is  gathered 
together  under  the  term  "  Spirit  Sciences  "  which  is  set 
over  against  "Nature  Sciences."  The  names  usually  as- 
sociated with  this  movement  are  those  of  Rickert,  who 
preferred  the  phrase  culture-sciences,  Windelband,  Dil- 
they,  Wundt,  and  Miinsterberg.  Dilthey  says  in  his 
Einl.  in  die  Geistes-wissenschaften,  Page  33:  "  The 
Spirit  sciences  are  made  up  of  three  classes  of  proposi- 
tions— fact,  theorem,  and  value- judgment.  From  the 
first  root  in  consciousness,  however,  up  to  the  highest 
point,  is  the  nexus  of  value  judgments  and  imperatives 
independent  from  the  first  two  classes  of  fact  and  uni- 
formity." 

Windelband  seems  to  have  been  led  to  make  this  dis- 
tinction through  a  revolt  against  the  carrying  of  nature 
science  methods  over  into  history.  When  history  is  read 
in  terms  of  cause-effect  relations,  it  becomes  mechanical 
and  the  meaning  of  events  is  either  removed  or  postponed 
indefinitely.  Carlyle's  method  of  setting  forth  each 
event  and  man  to  appeal  to  us,  was  felt  to  be  closer  to 
experience.  As  other  attempts  to  supplement  intellectu- 
alism  may  be  mentioned  the  value-judgments  of  the  Kit- 
schlians,  also  Ethical  Idealism  directed  against  the  Neo- 
Hegelians  and  Ethical  Monism  directed  against  the  Scien- 
tific Monism. 

8 


The  Worth  of  Life. 

These  references  to  supplements  to  intellectualism  are 
sufficient  to  establish  the  fact  stated  by  Wuudt  in  his 
Einleitung  that  "along  with  the  conception  of  Philoso- 
phy as  a  theoretic  discipline  there  have  ever  been  concep- 
tions of  it  as  Giiterlehre — both  elements  have  been  recog- 
nized in  the  great  systems." 

Out  of  the  great  mass  of  experience  we  find  separating 
two  points  of  view,  one  formal,  with  constantly  increas- 
ing success  in  shaking  itself  free  from  values,  the  other 
practical  realizing  ever  more  and  more  that  the  question 
of  worths  and  values  is  its  nucleus.  The  ultimate  type  of 
the  former  is  the  purely  formal  science  of  mathematics 
where  two  plus  two  equals  four,  no  matter  whether  the 
two  stands  for  atoms,  or  men,  or  dollars.  Its  goal  is  to 
express  experience,  as  far  as  possible  in  these  formal 
terms.  Mechanics  and  physics  are  to  be  reduced  as  far 
as  possible  to  mathematical  terms,  chemistry  to  mechan- 
ics ;  biology  and  physiology  to  chemistry ;  and  psychol- 
ogy to  physiology,  and  thus  ultimately  to  mathematics. 

Along  with  this  very  legitimate  ambition  is  the  desire 
to  do  justice  to  the  worth  in  life  and  all  the  various  at- 
tempts to  supplement  intellectualism,  each  using  a  differ- 
ent vocabulary,  have  their  root  and  their  justification  in 
their  recognition  of  values.  It  is  in  the  extent  that  they 
attain  this  recognition  without  doing  violence  to  the  first 
tendency,  that  they  obtain  our  sympathy  and  that  they 
have  an  influence. 

A  careful  examination  of  these  supplements  will,  I 
think,  substantiate  this  last  statement.  Though  they 
seem  so  divergent  in  their  aims  and  though  what  they 
actually  attain  seems  often  so  far  removed  from  the  idea 
of  worths  yet  worths  is  their  main  motive,  and  when  they 
swing  away  from  that  motive  interest  in  them  is  gone. 

As  illustrating  such  loss  of  interest,  contrast  for  in- 
stance the  difference  in  the  force  of  the  appeal  made  to 
men  by  Philosophy's  God  and  the  Christ  of  Christian ty. 
The  former,  the  Absolute,  the  God  who  possesses  the  at 

9 


tributes  of  omnipotence,  omniscience  and  omnipresence 
does  not  stir  any  one  who  is  not  already  under  religious 
impulse  derived  elsewhere.  Christianity  has  had  to  de- 
pend on  the  worth  for  society  of  the  personality  of  Christ 
for  its  propagation  and  not  on  the  arguments  of  Theism. 
Christ  has  been  received  as  a  worth,  Philosophy's  God  as 
a  truth.  In  contrasting  the  influence  of  the  two,  as  rep- 
resenting worth  and  truth,  it  is  enlightening  to  note  fur- 
ther that  not  a  single  attribute  of  the  God  of  Philosophy 
is  to  be  found  in  Christ  and  not  one  of  Christ's  attributes 
is  to  be  found  in  Philosophy's  God.  No  wonder  that  it 
is  difficult  for  a  "Natural  Theologian"  to  say  that  Christ 
was  the  Son  of  God.  For  he  was  not  the  son  of  Philos- 
ophy's God,  but  in  his  life  of  love  he  revealed  the  fact 
that  there  is  something  worth  while  in  existence.  His 
revelation  was  of  love,  of  worth  and  not  of  power  or  of 
a  cause,  or  of  an  absolute,  and  herein  has  lain  its  influ- 
ence. To  love  your  neighbor  means  to  feel  the  worth  of 
your  neighbor.  To  love  God  means  to  feel  a  worth  in  life 
above  your  life.  To  love  self  means  to  feel  the  worth  of 
self.  Love  is  a  sufficient  characterization  of  God.  God 
is  love  means  that  God  is  wliat  is  worth  while  in  exist- 
ence. Only  out  of  the  idea  of  worth  can  be  built  up  his 
personality,  as,  I  think,  will  appear  later.  The  worth, 
the  value  in  existence  is  God.  Therefore  Christians  are 
able  to  insist  that  only  he  has  begun  to  have  a  right  con- 
ception of  God  who  can  say  that  Christ  was  his  son, 
because  Christ's  life  was  the  life  of  the  highest  worth  ; 
that  is,  the  highest  incarnation  of  worth  which  we  have 
had.  The  message  of  Christianity  to  a  pleasure-loving 
age,  to  an  indifferent  age,  to  an  age  of  pessimism,  is 
simple  but  all  important :  "There  is  a  worth  in  exist- 
ence, and  that  worth  is  to  be  found  in  the  life  and  death 
of  Christ." 

If  before  deciding  whether  there  is  any  worth  in  exist- 
ence we  wait  for  reasoning  to  prove  it,  "no  worth"  will 
be  our  verdict.  Reasoning  can  only  manipulate  what  has 
already  been  given  it.  The  syllogism  does  not  add  to  the 
contents  of  the  major  premise.  Hence  pessimism  or  no 
worth  is  the  goal  of  intellectualism. 

10 


Wherever  we  look,  at  Religion  or  Practical  Philoso- 
phy or  at  the  Geistes-wissenschaften,  we  shall  find  that 
the  worth  in  life  is  the  distinguishing  postulate  of  the  sup- 
plements to  intellectualism.  Our  interest  in  immortality 
and  the  repeated  defences  of  it  do  not  arise  out  of  a  de- 
sire to  go  on  living  forever  like  an  indestructible  atom 
but  they  are  the  result  of  the  natural  repulsion  against 
the  loss  of  value.  The  proof  of  immortality  does  not 
establish  the  value  in  our  life  but  the  fact  of  the  latter  is 
the  basis  for  any  expectation  of  immorality.  Again  from 
the  scientific  point  of  view,  we  should  exult  over  the  suc- 
cess in  introducing  necessity  into  the  realm  of  motives. 
In  fact,  however,  we  rebel  against  determinism,  and  this 
is  because  it  takes  away  any  meaning  in  our  conduct. 

In  laying  this  emphasis  on  the  worth  side  of  experi- 
ence as  a  counterpart  to  the  truth  side,  it  is  not  our  in- 
tention to  enter  into  the  epistemological  analysis  which 
follows,  prejudiced.  But  it  is  legitimate,  when  there  are 
such  an  indefinite  number  of  bases  for  a  classification  of 
the  facts  of  consciousness  to  use,  as  a  hypothesis,  the 
clue  furnished  by  a  cleavage  in  the  whole  of  experience, 
a  cleavage  which  may  perhaps  have  its  foundation  in  the 
very  elements  of  consciousness.  When  we  take  up  the 
analysis  of  consciousness  with  a  previous  notion  of  that 
for  which  we  are  looking,  there  is  a  risk  that  we  may  be 
on  the  wrong  track  and  that  we  shall  be  misled.  There 
is,  however,  when  we  enter  such  a  maze,  the  increased 
probability  of  picking  up  the  right  clue  when  we  have  an 
idea  of  what  it  is.  This  introduction,  therefore,  which 
has  indicated  I  hope  the  deep  hold  upon  us  of  the  world 
of  worths,  far  from  vitiating  the  analysis  to  which  we 
are  about  to  proceed,  is  the  only  thing  which  prevents 
me  from  feeling  presumptuous  in  pitting  the  results  here 
reached  against  those  of  profounder  and  more  experienced 
psychologists.  Feeling  assured  that  there  is  a  meaning,  a 
worth  in  existence,  and  being  driven  back  from  trying  to 
find  this  worth  in  an  over-man,  or  in  a  future  age,  or  in 
a  social  organism,  to  the  individual  consciousness  as 
the  ultimate  basis  for  such  an  assurance,  we  approached 

11 


the  investigation  with  the  certainty  of  finding  a  definite 
element  there — not  so  unscientific  an  approach  as  some 
might  think.  I  am  convinced  that  no  worth  in  existence 
and  no  purpose  in  existence  into  which  the  time  element 
enters  as  a  constituent  part,  as,  for  instance,  with  the 
evolutionists,  has  yet  been  validly  based.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  I  would  reject  the  teleological  argument  as 
unable  to  establish  a  worth. 

The  most  pressing  problem  in  Philosophy  is  to  articu- 
late practical  Philosophy  with  theoretical  Philosophy, 
worth  with  truth.  This  is  an  epistemological  problem, 
if  we  are  permitted  to  extend  the  word  epistemology  to 
include  the  whole  analysis  of  consciousness.  Just  as  the 
question  uwhat  is  true?"  became  the  question  "what  is 
truth?"  so  the  question  what  is  of  value  has  become, 
what  is  value?  Is  there  value?  Consciousness  is  the 
final  court  in  the  former  case  and  must  be  likewise  the 
final  court  in  the  latter  case,  for  as  we  have  said  if  value 
be  not  postulated  in  the  premise  it  can  never  be  argued 
into  the  conclusion.  The  element  of  value  is  as  funda- 
mental as  the  notion  of  existence. 

THE  EPISTEMOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS. 

Consciousness  the   Ultimate  Point  of  Departure. 

In  every  day  language  experience  is  spoken  of  as  the 
ultimate  point  of  departure ;  we  may  say,  moreover,  that 
psychologists  are  agreed  in  taking  consciousness  as  the 
ultimate  point  of  departure  for  experience,  consciousness 
and  experience  being,  as  I  think  will  be  clear  later,  the 
same  thing  looked  at  in  different  relations. 

There  are  not  wanting  great  names  of  philosophers  who 
use  elements  which  they  do  not  feel  obliged  to^trace  back 
to  consciousness.  But  it  seems  safe  to  say  that  whencever 
the  elements  of  experience,  even  of  will  or  intuition  or 
"Stellungnehmen,"  may  have  originated,  they  are,  in 
some  way,  in  consciousness  now,  and  since  we  cannot  talk 
about  them  except  in  relation  to  consciousness  our  inves- 
tigation must  hold  to  its  terminology. 


More  difficult  to  convince  than  such  philosophers  are 
e  scientists  who  attempt  to  tell  what  the  world  was 
before  consciousness  evolved.  To  the  psychologists  the 
argument  seems  simple:  All  the  terms  which  the  evolu- 
tionist uses — heat,  weight,  pressure,  dust,  energy — are 
present  to  the  consciousness  and  have  a  meaning  as  terms 
only  to  consciousness;  in  and  out  of  conscious  experience 
(really  a  tautological  phrase)  has  been  evolved  the  world 
as  each  one  knows  it;  even  the  expression,  ''unconscious 
thought,"  has  to  be  established  out  of  the  elements  in 
consciousness  and  though  the  evolutionist  talks  confi- 
dently of  the  evolving  consciousness,  his  supposedly  in- 
dependent world  must  be  likewise  established  out  of  ele- 
ments in  consciousness.  Perhaps  the  scientist  would 
be  more  open  to  persuasion  if  we  should  assure  him  that 
tliis  position  does  not  necessarily  sublimate  the  reality  of 
the  world  in  which  he  is  interested. 

The  Analysis  of  Consciousness. 

With  the  natural  analysis  of  consciousness  into  differ- 
ent states  we  are  all  familiar.  From  it  have  come  the  dif- 
ferent senses,  the  different  qualities,  the  different  feel- 
ings, the  different  emotions,  the  different  desires,  etc.  It 
is  very  valuable  for  Psychology.  In  epistemology,  how- 
ever, \ve  would  try  to  go  a  little  further  and  analyze  each 
state.  This  will  perhaps  restore  to  consciousness  that 
unity  which  the  analysis  into  states  seems  to  take  away. 

The  popular  analysis  into  intellect,  sensibility  and  will, 
when  not  understood  as  an  ontological  rending  asunder, 
is  an  attempt  more  in  our  direction.  It  has  proved  very 
helpful  and  \ve  ought  not  to  let  go  of  it  entirely.  It 
throws  some  light  but  not  enough,  and  in  itself  has  led 
to  confusion,  because  intellection  contains  both  sensi- 
bility and  will,  and  so  each  in  turn  contains  the  other 
two. 

For  a  first  step  there  seems  to  be  a  way  less  accidental, 
viz.  :  to  separate  out  one  element  if  possible  and  put  pro- 
visionally what  is  left  under  a  second  name. 

13 


Subject  and   Object. 

Such  terms  will  contain  just  as  much  meaning  as  we 
put  into  them.  We  will  put  into  them  that  meaning 
which  gives  comprehensibility  to  the  greatest  number  of 
phenomena.  The  importance  of  the  terms  and  of  the 
analysis  will  depend  on  our  success  in  finding  a  basis  of 
differentiation  which  will  do  justice  to  the  greatest  num- 
ber of  facts.  Therefore  we  might  set  off  X  and  Y  and 
find  out  what  content  can  be  given  an  X  as  against  a 
content  for  Y.  We  have  the  right,  however,  as  a  hypothe- 
sis to  take  a  hint  from  one  of  the  most  striking  differ- 
ences which  we  expect  to  bring  into  line  namely  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  I  and  the  not-I.  That  distinction, 
however,  may  not  be  a  fundamental  one  and  we  must  still 
be  careful  to  put  into  the  words  we  may  adopt  only  such 
a  content  as  experience  allows  us.  Epistemology  long 
ago  attempted  a  two-fold  analysis  and  has  set  over 
against  each  other  the  two  words  subject  and  object,  bor- 
rowed from  logic. 

It  is  well  to  use  these  words  because  each  points  to  the 
other,  and  if  we  hold  fast  to  them  we  shall  not  be  led  in- 
to trying  to  define  consciousness  as  a  whole  (our  point  of 
departure)  in  terms  of  one  of  the  elements  found  in  it. 
There  is  no  object  without  a  subject  and  no  subject  with- 
out an  object.  The  separation  accordingly  is  not  onto- 
logical,  nor  is  there  any  absolute  division.  Whatever 
elements  we  may  find,  there  must  be  a  reference  in  them, 
expressed  or  implied,  to  the  rest  of  the  elements. 

Any  one,  therefore,  who  speaks  of  unconscious  will 
thereby  proclaims  that  he  did  not  obtain  his  conception 
of  will  out  of  the  analysis  of  consciousness;  he  has  di- 
vided the  faculties. 

For  our  reciprocal  terms  we  might  have  used  internal 
and  external  save  that  this  almost  unavoidably  leads  to 
what  Avenarius  has  called  "interjection,"  or  we  might 
have  used  center  and  circumference,  save  that  technically 
the  center  is  an  infinitely  small  point  and  when  used  for 
the  subject  it  becomes  difficult  to  give  a  content  to  a  van- 

14 


ishing  point.  We  can  also  see  that  if  emptied  of  most 
of  their  contents  save  that  of  reciprocity  we  might  have 
used  the  words  antecedent  and  consequent,  or  up  and 
down,  or  numerator  and  denominator,  etc.  All  these 
possibilities  are  mentioned  to  show  how  colorless  must  be 
the  words  subject  and  object  to  start  with,  because  many 
of  the  difficulties  in  Epistemology  have  been  artificial, 
caused  by  trying  to  press  an  analogy  or  metaphor. 

Pressing  Analogies. 

In  the  use  of  the  words  subject  and  object,  for  instance, 
the  pressing  of  logical  analogies  has  been  a  remarkable 
source  of  confusion.  Some  going  so  far  as  to  say  that 
the  subject  can  never  be  investigated,  because  when  ex- 
amined it  at  once  becomes  an  object  and  thus  loses  its 
subjective  character.  Brentano  speaks  first  of  the  object 
which  is  conceived,  judged  and  desired ;  second,  the  act 
of  conceiving,  judging  or  desiring;  but  the  third,  the 
subject,  is  beyond  his  ken.  Bradley  also  makes  the 
predicate  or  object  an  adjective :  only  the  subject  is  real. 
These  are  forcing  of  analogies  quite  as  much  as  is  the  re- 
ducing of  the  subject  as  a  center  to  a  vanishing  point,  or 
the  similar  picture,  where  the  subject  is  regarded  as  the 
small  end  of  a  cornucopia,  with  the  object  as  the  large  end 
so  that  attempts  to  examine  the  subject  are  compared  to 
the  wish  of  the  eye  to  see  itself. 

Some  seem  to  picture  the  ego  as  a  planet  upon  which 
the  consciousness  moves,  thinking  at  first  that  up  and 
down  is  a  fundamental  relation  in  things  till  a  higher 
astronomy  resolves  the  difference  into  one  of  direction. 
Now  this  as  an  analogy  is  well  enough,  but  is  not  suffic- 
ient for  the  basis  of  a  system. 

In  regard  to  the  grammatical  analogy  mentioned  above 
and  the  assertion  that  the  subject  can  never  be  examined 
because  it  at  once  becomes  the  object  (in  a  sentence)  it 
should  be  remembered  that  it  is  not  the  subject  alone,  as 
they  seem  to  think,  which  is  examining,  but  the  as  yet 
undifferentiated  subject-object,  that  is,  the  present  state 
of  consciousness  which  is  analyzing  a  past.  If  grammar 

15 


prevents  the  previous  subject's  being  examined  so  does  it 
prevent  the  present  "object's"  pretending  to  examine.  It 
is  as  possible  for  the  present  subject-object  to  examine 
the  previous-  subject  as  to  examine  the  previous  object. 
Its  affirmations  about  the  object  are  quite  as  open  to 
question  as  those  about  the  subject.  In  these  and  similar 
paralogisms  the  word  subject  is  used  in  a  metaphysical 
sense  and  no  longer  in  an  epistemological  sense. 

Probably  our  speaking  as  though  the  present  state  ex- 
amined the  past  introduces  an  artificial  difficulty.  A 
state  of  consciousness  is  not  an  object  held  up  to  view, 
and  the  lines  we  introduce  divide  up  experience  as  little 
as  the  equator  bothers  the  earth.  Pure  experience  knows 
no  distinction  as  that  between  a  subject-object  first  not 
opened  up  and  then  cracked  open  like  a  nut.  Perhaps  a 
higher  knowledge  may  show  a  subject-object  in  other  re- 
lations. For  our  consciousness,  which  is  the  inside  of 
the  nut,  there  are  only  the  elements  which  appear,  in 
one  respect,  as  subject  and  object.  We  shall  deal  with 
it  according  to  our  light  and  not  press  a  figure  as  though 
we  could  stand  outside  of  consciousness.  It  will  not  do 
to  let  the  epistemological  subject  which  is  an  element  in 
consciousness  be  supplanted  by  a  very  different  meta- 
physical subject  which  includes  both  subject  and  object. 

The  pressing  of  the  grammatical  analogy  and  this  view 
of  the  ego  as  something  standing  outside  of  conscious- 
ness, or  a  something  of  which  the  consciousness  is  a 
functioning,  will  come  up  again  when  we  come  to  speak 
of  those  who  put  the  will  for  the  subject.  Let  it  be  un- 
derstood that  the  objection  is  not  to  the  use  of  analogies, 
because  all  description  must  be  in  analogies,  but  the  use 
must  be  justified  by  experience  and  the  analogy  must  not 
be  used  as  a  proof. 

Reciprocity   in    Analysis. 

With  the  clue  that  apparently  the  principal  fact  to  be 
accounted  for  is  the  distinction  between  the  ego  and  non- 
ego,  we  start  with  thetwo  words  subject  and  object  which 
have  so  far  merely  the  element  of  reciprocity.  The  figure 

16 


which  best  represents  this  reciprocity  is  that  used  in 
mathematics  when  a  plane  is  analyzed  into  the  X  and  Y 
co-ordinates. 


Suttject 


This  figure  shows  that  there  is  no  experience,  or  reality, 
or  consciousness  which  does  not  contain  both  subject  and 
object.  Each  is  a  supplement  to  the  other,  and  it  takes 
both  to  restore  the  experience,  or  reality,  or  conscious- 
ness. Since  we  expect  to  take  the  above  diagram  as  the 
type  of  our  analysis,  it  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  point 
out  that  it  is  the  type  of  all  analysis.  It  is  misleading 
to  picture  an  analysis  as  dividing  into  two  independent 
parts.  An  inseparable  element  in  each  part  is  always  its 
relation  to  the  other  part.  When  water  is  analyzed  into 
oxygen  and  hydrogen  an  inalienable  part  of  the  reality 
of  each  is  its  relation  to  the  other,  and  the  same  diagram 
must  be  used  to  express  the  reciprocity.  An  analysis  is 
never  ontological. 

Oxygen 


Hydrogen 


The  diagram  shows  the  unity,  but  yet  does  justice  to 
the  difference.     The  diagram  does  not  explain  anything. 

2P  17 


It  does  not  solve  the  problem  of  like  and  unlike,  or  unity 
and  plurality,  but  it  gives  a  picture  and  makes  graspable 
what  might  otherwise  present  insurmountable  difficulties 
to  our  thinking.  Some  of  these  difficulties  which  other- 
wise threaten  to  block  the  way  are  bridged  over,  and  we 
are  able  to  proceed  with  our  investigation. 

Intellection 


Feeling 


For  instance,  intellection  and  feeling  are  shown  to  be, 
by  experience,  independent  variables,  yet  there  is  no  in- 
tellection without  feeling  and  no  feeling  without  intel- 
lection. Now  without  stopping  to  war  over  the  question 
as  to  which  is  to  be  reduced  to  the  other  we  make  a  pic- 
ture of  their  identity  and  difference  and  are  able  to  go  on. 

Artificiality  of  the  Analysis  Into  Subject  and   Object 

There  have  been  some  criticisms  of  the  analysis  into 
subject  and  object  on  the  ground  that  it  was  artificial ; 
that  it  is  not  the  one  which  would  naturally  occur  to  an 
unpsychological  mind.  It  has  been  asserted  that  any 
analysis  which  claims  to  be  primitive  and  fundamental 
must  be  a  natural  one,  one  that  might  be  present  to  a 
very  elementary  consciousness.  We  answer  that  all  clas- 
sifications and  categories  are  hypotheses  which  survive 
out  of  the  whole  of  experience  after  a  struggle  with  com- 
peting hypotheses.  They  depend  for  their  importance 
and  reality  on  being  the  result  of  a  wide  range  of  experi- 
ence. Provided  that  they  are  applicable  to  the  particu- 
lar cases,  the  wideness  of  their  applicability  enhances 

18 


rather  than  diminishes  their  reality.  Our  analysis  into 
subject  and  object  therefore  must  account  for  the  ele- 
ments of  elementary  consciousnesses,  but  we  could  not  at 
all  expect  it  to  occur  to  them.  Truth  is  organic  and  not 
inorganic.  It  grows  not  by  accretion  but  by  evolution. 
We  can  not  lay  down  a  bit  of  truth  like  a  bit  of  a 
pyramid  and  expect  to  find  it  in  the  larger  truth.  The 
larger  truth  though  including  all  the  facts  may  entirely 
exrlude  the  lesser  truth. 

VARIOUS  CONTENTS  FOR  SUBJECT  AND  OBJECT 

For  the  words  subject  and  object,  the  content  with 
which  we  start  out  is  reciprocity ;  and  our  clue  of  ego 
and  non-ego  we  are  ready  to  abandon  for  a  better  one  as 
soon  as  the  facts  require  it.  The  use  of  the  words,  how- 
ever, is  not  new,  and  it  will  help  us  to  have  in  mind  the 
diiferent  meanings  that  have  been  put  into  them. 

The  Spinozistic  Philosophy  put  thought  for  one  and 
extension  for  the  other  leading  to  an  insurmountable 
dualism.  Kant  put  for  the  subject  that  which  gave  the 
form  and  for  the  object  that  which  gave  the  content,  thus 
requiring  a  "Ding  an  sich"  on  each  side.  His  successors 
sublimated  the  latter  "Ding  an  sich",  the  materialists 
the  former,  the  Neo-Kantians  both,  which  was  a  step  in 
the  right  direction.  The  Realists  tried  to  resolve  the  two 
into  a  higher  unity,  as,  for  instance,  the  Identity  Phil- 
osophy or  some  of  the  advocates  of  the  Will  Philosophy. 

A  very  modern  system  which  has  already  been  tun  ted 
at,  is  that  which  defines  the  subject  as  a  Center-factor 
(Zentralglied)  and  the  object  as  the  Reacting-! actor 
(Gegeuglied).  Compare  the  picture  of  our  planet  moving 
among  the  other  heavenly  bodies  where  each  one  in  turn 
may  be  regarded  as  the  center  of  the  universe  around 
which  all  the  rest  move.  This  position  expounded  by 
Kiilpe("Das  Ich  und  die  Aussenwelt."  Phil.  Studien 
'92)  is  a  development  of  the  Empirio-Critical  position  and 
in  its  overcoming  the  cornucopia  psychology  and  the  in- 
ner-and-outer  Philosophy  has  been  of  great  value.  Fur- 
thermore, as  a  picture  it  provides  a  very  good  monistic 

19 


basis.  All  of  experience  is  reduced  to  a  sort  of  network 
where  each  G-egenglied  is  also  a  Zentralglied.  A  tree  is 
a  Gegenglied  for  me  but  I  am  also  a  Gegenglied  for  it. 

We  reject  it  as  insufficient  because  there  is  no  differ- 
ence except  of  direction  between  subject  and  object,  and 
no  further  meaning  can  be  put  into  the  picture.  Each 
object  is  a  subject.  It  reduces  the  distinction  to  a  point 
of  view  and  is  not  properly  an  analysis. 

This  is  a  good  instance  of  making  a  system  of  an  anal- 
ogy. Monism  is  obtained  by  eliminating  instead  of  har- 
monizing differences.  The  analogy  is  good,  but  not 
enough  to  solve  our  problems.  To  really  grapple  with 
the  facts  of  experience,  we  must  differentiate  the  subject 
from  the  object  by  more  than  a  geometric  direction.  The 
subject  is  more  than  a  center  of  concepts. 

Besides  all  this,  if  we  regard  our  consciousness,  as 
Miinsterberg  says,  with  our  eyes  closed,  we  shall  iind  no 
Zentralglied  but  all  Gegenglieds,  and  we  have  been  again 
confusing  a  Philosophical  subject  with  an  Epistemolog- 
ical  one.  Perhaps  the  Epistemological  subject  is  not  a 
"Glied"  at  all. 

The  limitations  of  this  system  come,  I  believe,  from  its 
having  originated  out  of  a  polemic  against  those  who  put 
inner  experience  for  the  subject  and  outer  experience  for 
the  object.  This  last  position  has  a  historical  interest 
but  no  Epistemological  basis,  and  we  may  pass  it  over, 
coming  to  the  Psychology  most  accepted  by  us  in 
America. 

The  Subject  as  Will. 

Here  the  analysis  into  subject  and  object  is  accepted 
and  as  the  content  of  the  subject  is  put  will,  for  the  ob- 
ject is  put  whatever  else  there  is  in  consciousness,  some- 
times the  feeling  being  absorbed  into  the  will  in  some 
way  or  else  everything  apparently  being  thrown  to  the 
side  of  the  object. 

This  division  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind  into  will  and 
intellection  is  the  classical  one  and  prevailed  in  England 
till  the  coming  in  of  Kantian  influence.  Practical  con- 

20 


duct  and  Ethics  gave  will ;  Logic  and  concepts  gave  in- 
tellect. It  was  perhaps  Rousseau's  emphasis  on  feelings 
and  Aesthetics  which  led  Kant  to  add  as  a  third  faculty 
that  of  feeling.  Some  therefore  call  this  identifying  of 
the  subject  with  the  will,  a  return  to  the  pre-Kantian 
view.  Its  vogue  in  the  United  States  is  due  in  part  to 
its  seeming  to  afford  a  basis  to  practical  life  and  ethics. 
Its  popularity  is  a  part  of  our  practical  nature. 

To  my  mind  the  refutation  of  the  will-philosophy  re- 
quires more  training  in  Psychological  lore  than  a  setting 
aside  of  it  by  a  better  philosophy.  Because,  however,  I  do 
not  pretend  to  have  done  justice  to  the  latter  and  am  un- 
willing to  leave  anything  undone  which  may  interest 
thinkers  in  it,  it  seems  worth  while  to  attempt  a  criticism 
of  the  will-philosophy.  Perhaps  enough  weaknesses  will 
be  pointed  out  to  shake  the  absolute  confidence  which  it 
seems  to  enjoy  in  some  circles.  At  any  rate  to  those  who 
are  not  already  pledged  to  its  support,  our  discussion 
may  serve  to  show  that  its  claims  have  not  been  over- 
looked. 

The  refutation  of  the  will-philosophy  is  difficult  be- 
cause so  much  that  is  good  seems  inextricably  bound  up 
with  it  and  furthermore  there  are  no  single  lines  of  argu- 
ment, which  its  advocates  agree  upon.  Each  writer  takes 
a  different  position  and  the  complaint  of  one  of  them 
(Caldwell,  I  think)  that  they  do  not  present  a  solid  front, 
but  each  spends  his  best  energy  in  criticising  the  others, 
is  justified. 

We  may  perhaps  distinguish  three  types.  First  there  is 
no  attempt  to  get  outside  of  consciousness,  the  will  is  put 
for  the  subject  and  the  concept  for  the  object ;  Wundt  and 
Ward  have  been  regarded  as  exponents  of  this  position. 
Second,  the  will  or  subject  is  outside  and  unsearchable 
while  the  object  is  the  conceptual  world  (Schopenhauer). 
Third,  the  subject  is  conceived  of  as  outside ;  conscious- 
ness is  its  functioning  and  the  concepts  or  the  results  of 
its  functioning  make  up  the  object.  Of  this  view  Miins- 
terberg  and  the  Neofichteans  are  the  exponents.  Often 

21 


the  three  types  seem  to  be  held  in  different  pages  of  the 
same  book,  though  in  systematic  thinking  there  is  a  con- 
stant tendency  to  start  from  the  first  type  and  be  contin- 
ually pushed  along  till  the  will  has  become  a  postulate  in 
either  the  second  or  third  types. 

Schopenhauer. 

Schopenhauer,  for  instance  (Welt  als  Wille  and  Vors- 
tellung),  says  in  section  7 :  "Our  point  of  departure  has 
been  from  neither  subject  nor  object,  but  from  the  Vorstel- 
lung  which  already  contains  both  and  presupposes  both." 
This  promises  a  psychological  basis.  In  section  5,  how- 
ever, he  identifies  the  Vorstellung  with  the  object :  "Vors- 
tellung and  object  which  are  indeed  one  *  *  *  object  and 
Vorstellung  are  the  same."  And  in  section  18,  paragraph 
2,  as  also  in  the  Treatise  on  Sufficient  Reason,  he  inden- 
tifies  subject  and  will.  In  the  latter  part  of  section  7,  he 
gives  up  finding  the  real  subject  in  the  Vorstellung  at  all. 
After  he  has  shown  the  one-sidedness  of  Materialism  and 
Solipsism  and  thus  the  interdependence  between  the  sub- 
ject and  object,  he  continues  that  this  enables  us  to  see 
"that  the  innermost  essence  of  the  world,  the  Ding  an 
sich,  is  not  to  be  found  in  either  of  these  two  elements  of 
the  Vorstellung."  In  section  18,  paragraph  1,  he  frankly 
confesses  his  inability  to  find  the  will  in  consciousness. 
"In  fact  the  desired  significance  of  the  world  which  is 
given  to  me  simply  as  my  Vorstellung,  or  the  passage 
from  it  as  a  mere  Vorstellung  of  the  knowing  subject  to 
that  which  it  may  be  besides,  would  never  be  found  if 
the  investigator  were  nothing  else  than  the  purely  know- 
ing subject,  a  winged  cherub  without  a  body."  This 
leads  to  the  .body  as  the  point  of  departure. 

Schopenhauer  is  worth  quoting  from  at  length  because 
most  of  the  will -philosophers  are  his  disciples.  Miin- 
sterberg  we  are  reminded  of  all  through  here.  For  in- 
stance when  he  says  (Psychology,  p.  25)  :  "If  my  being 
were  merely  a  theoretical  observation  (Auschauung)  of 
the  surrounding  then  of  course  I  would  know  of  no  ich 

22 


which  should  be  given  me  different  in  principle  from  the 
surroundings." 

To  return  to  Schopenhauer,  in  section  19,  having  for- 
saken Psychology  as  the  point  of  departure,  he  takes  the 
body  :  "The  knowing  subject  is  therefore  an  individual 
through  this  special  relation  to  a  body  which  is  otherwise 
only  a  concept  like  all  other  bodies."  Section  18,  para- 
graph 3 :  "This  identity  of  the  will  and  the  body  can 
never  be  proved.  It  is  knowledge  of  a  wholly  peculiar 
sort  whose  truth,  therefore,  is  not  in  any  way  to  be 
brought  under  one  of  the  four  rubrics  into  which  in  the 
Treatise  on  Sufficient  Reason,  I  divided  all  truth — I 
might,  therefore,  distinguish  this  truth  from  all  others 
and  call  it  the  /car'  egoxrjv  philosophical  truth."  *  This 
is  honest  but  unconvincing.  And  finally:  "the  knowledge 
which  I  have  of  my  will,  although  immediate,  is  not  to  be 
separated  from  my  knowledge  of  my  body."  Sec.  18? 
par.  2. 

These  quotations  do  more  than  to  show  the  difficulties 
of  the  will -philosophy,  they  lead  up  to  the  fact  that  the 
will  is  to  be  associated  with  objects  rather  than  with  the 
subject;  here  with  the  body  rather  than  with  the  con- 
sciousness, and  in  other  cases  with  blind  impulses  and 
forces,  all  of  which  are  under  the  head  of  Yorstellungen 
and  energies.  There  is  no  call  for  a  "Wunder  /car  efo^i/" 
in  finding  a  place  for  will  among  the  other  energies  which 
make  up  the  objective  world.  But  of  this  later. 

The  Will  as  the  Subjective  Element  in  Consciousness. 

We  are  called  upon  to  discuss  this  as  a  distinct  type  of 
the  will-philosophy,  because,  although  the  thinkers 
usually  cited  as  exponents  of  the  position  are  not  them- 
selves satisfied  with  it  for  their  final  basis,  yet  the  opin- 
ion has  gone  about  that  some  of  our  best  Psychologists 
consider  it  a  sufficient  basis  for  a  system,  and  isolated 

*  Compare  the  opinion  with  which  James  likes  to  dally:  "Our  entire 
feeling  of  spiritual  activity  or  what  commonly  passes  by  that  name  is 
really  a  feeling  of  bodily  activities.  Psy.  1-301. 

23 


quotations  from  their  works  would  seem  to  justify  this 
belief.  But  Wundt,  in  spite  of  his  apperception  theory, 
which  is  supposed  to  support  this  position,  follows  in  the 
footsteps  of  Schopenhauer,  making  the  object  all  that  is 
knowable  and  the  unknown  will  the  basis  of  the  phenom- 
enal. 

Furthermore,  although  he  is  supposed  to  have  started 
as  a  Psychologist  and  therefore  Epistemology  ought  to 
be  the  basis  of  his  system,  his  real  point  of  departure  is 
entirely  external  and  philosophical.  He  begins  with  a 
distinction  between  natural  sciences  and  spiritual  sciences, 
of  which  a  distinction  between  Will  and  Vorstellung  be- 
comes a  consequence.  We  have  already  called  attention 
to  his  inconsistency  in  subordinating  practical  philosophy 
to  theoretical  and  yet  in  psychology  reducing  the  object 
to  the  subject. 

James  also  is  not  for  a  moment  satisfied  with  finding 
the  will  as  subject  in  an  analysis  of  consciousness.  He 
comes  at  his  problem,  which  finally  appears  to  be  to  just- 
ify a  place  for  religion  and  the  practical  world  in  philos- 
ophy, again  and  again,  always  with  a  new  line  of  argu- 
ment. In  one  place  he  says  his  "reasons  for  belief  in  vol- 
untary attention  as  a  force  are  ethical."  Psy.  1-454.  In 
another  he  inclines  with  Schopenhauer  to  start  from  the 
body  as  a  point  of  departure :  "A  supply  of  ideas  of  the 
various  movements  that  are  possible,  left  in  the  memory 
by  experience  of  their  involuntary  performance,  is  thus 
the  first  prerequisite  of  the  voluntary  life."  Psy.  2-458. 
Again  in  Vol.  2-534  he  makes  a  sort  of  tri-partate  divis- 
ion, like  Spirit,  Soul,  and  Body,  and  defines  volition  as  a 
'  'relation  not  between  our  Self  and  extra-mental  reality, 
but  between  our  Self  and  our  states  of  mind." 

In  Yol.  1-225  he  takes  an  Epistemological  start  from 
"Thought  goes  on."  Analysis  shows  him  that  the  fifth 
and  final  element  included  in  the  process  of  thought  is  : 
"Thought  chooses  from  among  the  objects  independent  of 
itself."  This  fifth  element  then  becomes  by  mere  asser- 
tion the  basis  for  thought  and  choice  becomes  "the  sim- 

24 


plest  and  most  fundamental  characteristic  of  thought!" 
What  the  word  choice  can  mean,  or  selection  either,  to 
one  who  proclaims  himself  for  the  purpose  of  Psycholo- 
gy a  determinist,  it  is  hard  to  see.  A  determinist  con- 
ception of  will  would  seem  at  once  to  consign  it  to  the 
category  of  objects.  James,  however,  is  a  determinist 
only  when  he  wants  to  be  really  scientific.  The  rest  of 
the  time  he  accepts  free  will. 

The  hopelessness  of  trying  to  find  the  will  as  a  separate 
element  in  consciousness  would  seem  to  become  entirely 
patent  from  the  fact  that  whether  with  Laromiguiere  and 
the  earliest  Will-philosophers,  or  with  its  latest  advocates, 
it  is  always  a  feeling  of  strain  or  innervation  or  effort 
that  must  be  spoken  of.  Compare  Schopenhauer,  (W.  a. 
W.  u.  V.  Sec.  21,)  where  he  speaks  of  having  knowledge 
as  "a  feeling  that  the  essence  of  one's  own  appearance 
is  will."  And  James  2-298 :  "For  this  central  part  of 
the  Seltfelt."  "The  Self  is  the  notion  of  an  intimate 
activity  or  agency  which  has  become  loarm  through  re- 
peated emphasis,"  1-298.  Ladd,  Psy.,  p.  61,  defines  an 
act  of  attention  as  "a  purposeful  volition  suffused  with 
peculiar  feelings  of  effort  or  strain  and  accompanied  by  a 
changed  condition  of  the  field  of  discriminative  conscious- 
ness as  respects  intensity,  content  and  clearness.  In 
this  last  definition  the  words  "purposeful  volition"  are  a 
tautologous  repetition  of  what  we  set  out  to  define,  the 
third  element  confessedly  is  a  mere  accompaniment,  and 
we  have  left  as  the  definition  of  an  act  of  attention  4  'the 
peculiar  feelings  of  effort  or  strain." 

Aside  from  this  we  find  that  in  all  attempts  to  define 
what  is  meant  by  will,  recourse  is  had  to  what  we  clearly 
recognize  as  the  more  objective  factors  in  experience.  All 
descriptions  of  will  are  taken  from  phenomena  in  the  ob- 
ject world  and  the  purest  types  of  will  are  to  be  found  in 
the  least  subjective  facts.  The  answer  usually  made  to 
this  objection  is,  that  the  subject  recognizes  forces  only 
because  it  has  projected  its  own  characteristics  into  ob- 
jects. This  answer  is  Metaphysical  and  along  this  line, 

25 


all  content  would  be  lost  to  the  word  object.  Our  reason 
for  contrasting  subject  and  object  is  gone.  If  the  energy 
in  the  object  is  only  the  personification  of  the  subject  so 
is  all  the  rest  of  the  object. 

Subject  and  object  thus  come  very  close  together,  but 
somehow  the  explanatory  value  of  our  analysis  has  been 
dissipated.  In  our  indentification  of  energy  and  subject 
we  seem  to  be  approaching  the  old  materialism  which 
tried  to  define  consciousness  in  terms  of  motions.  James' 
statement,  Psy.  2-551:  "It  is  the  essence  of  conscious- 
ness (or  of  the  neural  process  which  underlies  it)  to  insti- 
gate movement  of  some  sort,"  will  do  as  a  statement  of 
fact  but  not  as  a  definition.  The  subject  we  are  trying 
to  define  is  something  different  from  a  force.  The  confus- 
ion between  description  and  definition  occurs  again  when 
consciousness  is  spoken  of  as  a  stream  and  the  word 
stream  is  then  put  as  its  distinguishing  and  fundamental 
character. 

It  is  here  that  we  find  the  difficulty  of  the  Monism 
which  Panpsychism  reaches.  Its  very  ease  makes  it  in- 
sufficient. If  the  psyche  or  will  be  unconscious  then  it  was 
not  found  in  consciousness,  and  therefore  is  a  repetition 
of  the  old  materialism.  A  Panpsychism,  however,  which 
puts  consciousness  into  moving  billiard  balls  is  startlingly 
metaphysical  and  has  contributed  not  one  whit  to  either 
Epistemology  or  Psychology.  All  talk  of  an  unconscious 
will  tastes  strongly  of  the  division  of  the  faculties.  Com- 
pare Schopenhauer,  Sec.  27:  "In  its  lowest  stages  the 
will  presents  itself  as  a  blind  tendency,  a  dark  senseless 
impulse." 

The  Subject  as   Will  Superior  to  Consciousness. 

As  we  have  said  those  psychologists  who  represent  the 
will  philosophy  have  seen  that  the  will  as  an  energy 
surely  includes  objects  and  therefore  is  superior  to  both 
subject  and  object  in  consciousness  or  else  as  a  subject 
reduces  the  objects  to  mere  accidents  of  itself.  They 
have  practically  quit  the  Epistemological  starting  point. 
It  is  absurd  for  them  to  keep  up  the  pretense  of  deriving 

26 


the  will  from  consciousness  when  it  is  perfectly  capable 
of  walking  by  itself  as  in  involuntary  activity.  With 
their  definition  of  the  Psyche  many  psychic  laws  would 
!>»-•  valid  beyond  the  realm  of  consciousness. 

The  following  quotations  will  show  that  some  psychol- 
ogists have  had  to  give  up  finding  the  will  as  an  ele- 
ment in  consciousness.  Ebbinghaus  Psy.,  p.  561: 
'•Will  acts  are  not  basal  appearances  of  the  soul  life 
in  the  same  sense  in  which  sensations  and  concepts 
are.  They  do  not  stand  along  side  these  as  a  new  class  of 
psychic  elementary  forms  whose  parts  are  or  are  not 
added  at  times  to  the  parts  of  the  other  classes,  but  they 
stand  above  them.  They  are  in  their  simplest  terms  the 
basal  form  of  the  unities  in  which  alone  sensations,  con- 
cepts and  feelings  appear  as  real.  The  impulse  (Trieb)  is 
a  will-act  without  the  accompanying  Vorstellung."  Com- 
pare Schopenhauer,  Sec.  19:  "We  must  learn  to  distin- 
guish from  the  will  itself  those  things  which  belong  to 
its  appearance,  which  has  many  gradations ;  for  in- 
stance, the  being  accompanied  by  knowledge  and  there- 
fore the  being  determined  by  motives.  These  belong,  as 
we  shall  see,  not  to  its  essence  but  only  to  its  clear  ap- 
pearance as  animal  and  man." 

To  return  to  Ebbinghaus,  Psy.  565:  "Will-acts  are 
therefore  not  ultimate  or  original  logically  but  chrono- 
logically they  are. "  566:  The  will  is  not  "something 
new,  different,  added  to  the  sensation,  concept  and  feel- 
ing which  can  immediately  be  experienced  but  not  fur- 
ther explained."  168  :  "Along  with  these  three  classes  of 
forms"  (feeling,  sensation,  and  concepts)  "there  is  no  oc- 
casion to  set  up,  in  addition,  will-acts  or  desires  as  spec- 
ial elementary  forms  of  the  soul  life.  The  psychic  con- 
ditions of  conduct  *  :  *  are  combinations  of  sensations, 
concepts,  and  feelings." 

So  Kiilpe,  Psy..  p.  267,  reduces  will  to  effort  and  con- 
cludes "The  elementary  will  quality,  therefore  would 
seem  to  reduce  to  definite  sensations  qualities." 

Those  who  desire  a  fuller  discussion  of  the  will-psychol- 
ogy will  find  the  ground  thoroughly  covered  in  a  series  of 

27 


articles  by  Bradley  in  Mind  1886,  p.  305:  "Is  there  any 
special  activity  of  attention"  ;  1887,  p.  354,  "Association 
and  Thought"  (especially  pages  366-7);  1888,  p.  1,  "On 
Pleasure,  Pain,  Desire,  and  Volition."  The  following 
quotations  will  show  Bradley 's  position  :  "Is  attention 
so  far  as  it  is  psycltial  activity,  an  original  element,  and 
is  there  any  specific  function  of  attention?  The  strict 
result  of  the  English  analytical  school  would  give  us  a 
negative  answer  to  both  of  these  questions.  With  that 
denial  I  agree  and  have  not  been  able  to  find  sufficient 
reason  to  doubt  its  truth."  Mind  1886,  p.  305.  "If  at- 
tention is  not  an  event  or  a  law  of  events,  has  it  a  right 
to  exist  in  empirical  science?  Is  it  not  simply  a  revivial 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  faculties?  It  becomes  a  phrase  of- 
fered in  explanation  of  phenomena  beyond  that  field  from 
which  it  has  been  drawn."  Mind  1887,  p.  366. 

Ward's  position  against  Bradley  is  given  in  Mind  1884, 
pp.  153  and  465;  1887,  p.  45  (a  reply  to  the  criticisms  by 
Bradley,  and  by  Bain  1886,  pp.  205  and  457)  and  1887, 
p.  564. 

Bradley  has  recently  returned  to  the  discussion  :  Mind 
1901,  p.  437  "Some  remarks  on  Conation";  1902,  p.  1, 
"On  active  attention"  ;  p.  289,  "On  Mental  Conflict  and 
Imputation";  p.  437,  "The  Definition  of  Will"  (the 
series  to  be  continued). 

A  very  good  review  of  Mdnsterberg's  attack  on  Wundt's 
apperception  theory  is  given  by  Croom  Robertson  in 
Mind  1890,  p.  235.  Ryland,  in  his  review  of  Stout's 
Manual  of  Psychology,  Mind  1901,  547,  calls  attention 
to  the  fact  that  Stout  never  once  mentions  the  word  ap- 
perception which  in  his  previous  work  played  the  princi- 
pal role. 

Compare  an  article  by  Loveday  on  "Theories  in  Mental 
Activity"  in  Mind  1901,  p.  455. 

The  Will  as  a  Subject  Intuited. 

It  might  seem  useless  to  leave  the  realm  of  Psychology 
and  pursue  the  argument  over  into  the  realm  of  Philoso- 
phy, whither  the  preceding  paragraph  would  take  us ; 

28 


especially  as  that  carries  us  into  the  field  where  intu- 
itions are  weighed  over  against  consciousness,  and  we  are 
made  acquainted  with  things  that  have  not  passed 
through  the  portal  of  knowledge.  The  name  of  Miinster- 
berg,  however,  carries  such  an  authority  as  being  that  of 
an  able  and  careful  psychologist  that,  though  he  frankly 
has  forsaken  psychology  as  his  starting  point  ("The  way 
to  Psychology  is  through  Philosophy"),  the  idea  prevails 
that  his  psychology  somewhere  accounts  for  his  identi- 
fying the  subject  with  will.  His  approach  like  Wundt's 
is  through  a  distinction  between  the  Geisteswissen- 
schaften  and  the  Naturwissenschaften.  He  differs  from 
Wundt  only  in  classing  psychology  with  the  Naturwis- 
seuschaften.  This  seems  to  take  away  every  basis  of  dis- 
cussion ;  for,  if  psychology  is  not  to  be  our  point  of  de- 
parture but  in  some  superior  way  has  been  consigned  to 
the  domain  that  deals  only  with  objects,  whence  are  we  to 
obtain  our  subject.  He  seems  to  have  two  lines  of  argu- 
ment, one  reminding  us  of  the  Faith  Philosophy  and  the 
other  of  Fichte.  A  fair  example  of  the  intuitional  stand- 
point is  the  following,  Psy.,  p.  50:  "The  real  ego  is  not 
something  which  is  perceived  and  looked  at  by  me  but  is 
the  self-affirming  (stellungnehmende)  actuality  of  which 
I  know  only  through  inner  activity  and  of  which  there- 
fore 1  know  in  an  incomparably  different  way  (Sinne) 
from  what  I  do  of  the  concepts  on  which  my  ego  lives 
(an  denen  mein  Ich  sich  auslebt)".  We  might  ask  how 
he  knows  enough  about  this  subject  to  call  it  will  instead 
of  letting  it  "answer  to  Hi  or  to  any  loud  cry."  Scho- 
penhauer in  Sec.  24,  par.  2,  of  his  World  as  Will  and 
Concept,  has  a  very  ingenious  explanation  to  account  for 
the  fact  that  this  will  which  is  the  best  known  thing  in 
experience  has  the  fewest  characteristics  of  knowability. 
His  reasoning  reduces  it  to  the  zero  of  knowability,  and 
we  cannot  avoid  comparing  this  infinite  zero,  as  an  explan- 
ation, with  the  infinite  absolute  of  the  old  theological  ex- 
planations. 

Of  Mtinsterberg's  Fichtean  line  of  argument  the  follow- 
ing is  an  example  where   there   must  be  an  Ich  because 

29 


there  is  a  nicht-Ich  and  where  the  whole  world  of  objects, 
including  all  of  existence  requires  a  subject  because  there 
can  be  no  object  without  a  subject.  We  would  say,  if 
the  logical  analogy  requires  such  an  assumption  in  order 
to  be  valid  then  do  not  use  it  at  all.  Psy.  p.  51,  "Das 
Wollen  requires  das  Nichtwollen  and  although  blue  has 
a  meaning  without  a  red,  and  even  a  black  without  a 
white,  or  cold  without  a  hot,  ein  Wollen  has  no  sense  un- 
less it  rejects  a  Nicht-Wollen  and  a  Nicht-Wollen  points 
back  to  a  Wollen."  The  verdict  of  a  hundred  years'  dis- 
cussion has  been  that  an  Ich  whose  only  claim  to  reality 
is  "Jenes  Gegensatzverhaltniss"  (Psy.,  p.  51)  is  not  called 
for. 

Final  Reasons  for  Rejecting  the  Identification 
of  Subject  and  Will. 

Before  concluding  this  sketchy  discussion  of  the  will- 
philosophy  we  will  mention  three  further  reasons  for  re- 
jecting the  identification  of  the  subject  with  will.  First, 
if  Mechanics  is  right  in  rejecting  the  word  force  as  be- 
ing anything  more  than  a  convenient  term  to  group  to- 
gether certain  occurrences,  all  content  would  be  taken  out 
of  the  word  will  and  therefore  out  of  the  word  subject  as 
the  basis  for  a  system. 

Second,  no  satisfactory  place  is  found  for  feeling.  Scho- 
penhauer, Sec.  11:  "The  idea  which  the  word  feeling 
characterizes  has  only  a  negative  content;  viz,  that  some- 
thing is  present  in  the  consciousness  which  is  not  abstract 
knowledge  of  the  reason."  In  Sec.  18,  par.  1,  however, 
he  classes  the  stronger  feelings  with  will  and  the  weaker 
ones  with  the  Vorstellungen.  Wunclt  and  Paulsen  try 
to  attach  feeling  to  the  will  in  some  way. 

Third,  no  justice  is  done  to  the  value  part  of  life  which 
includes  the  whole  range  of  experience.  To  say  with 
Wundt  that  will  implies  an  end  and  an  end  implies  a 
value  is  not  sufficient.  Others  forces  establish  no  ends 
and  no  value.  No  more  can  the  will.  If  the  worth  in 
experience  depends  on  the  will-philosophy,  the  verdict 

30 


must  be  no  worths — Pessimism.  A  will  as  an  element 
with  which  is  bound  up  a  value  element  is  manifestly  a 
conglomerate  and  open  to  further  analysis. 

In  rejecting  the  will  as  establishing  the  content  of  the 
subject,  we  have  not  overlooked  the  advantage  that  comes 
to  Monism  through  the  approach  of  the  ego  to  the  other 
objects  of  nature.  The  classical  dualism  between  con- 
sciousness and  matter  seems  to  be  overcome.  The  falling 
stone  is  a  spirit  like  my  moving  body.  Of  course,  we 
sympathize  with  all  endeavors  to  unify  experience,  but, 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  being  too  prompt  in  covering  over 
differences  through  eagerness  to  reach  the  unity.  In  this 
case  the  advantage  is  gained  by  surrendering  all  the  real 
content  of  consciousness.  Through  some  clever  feats  of 
jugglery,  consciousness  has  been  put  one  side,  and  we 
have  a  world  with  no  conscious  element  in  it. 

THE  SUBJECT  AS  HAYING  A  CONTENT. 

We  are  now  ready  to  consider  more  positively  what  can 
best  be  meant  by  the  analysis  into  subject  and  object. 
We  shall  try  to  put  into  the  words  some  significance  that 
shall  assist  us  in  classifying  and  understanding  our  ex- 
perience. Some  time  a  better  line  of  cleavage  may  be 
discovered  than  that  suggested  by  the  words  subject  and 
object.  In  such  a  case,  however,  the  inadequacy  and 
not  the  uselessness  of  this  present  division  will  appear. 

We  believe  that  if  the  word  subject  is  to  be  used  at  all 
it  must  have  some  content  and  be  so  far  knowable.  We 
cannot  see  the  advantage  of  using  the  term  if  it  is 
to  be  deprived  of  all  content.  It  seems  a  confession  of 
defeat  to  refuse  it  a  meaning  and  a  place  in  knowledge. 
The  following  objection  from  Miinsterberg  to  giving  it  a 
content  would  apply  to  all  knowledge,  and  he  could  say 
that  the  descriptions  of  redness  or  roundness  are  "retro- 
spective substitutes"  not  present  in  knowing.  The  dif- 
ficulty which  he  feels  seems  to  be  entirely  artificial.  *;I 
feel  as  my  ego  my  manner  of  acting  which  I  experience 
when  I  exert  myself.  This  is  an  actuality  to  me  because 
I  act.  I  know  it  because  I  will  it.  *  *  *  In  describing  it 

31 


I  would  use  words  like  feeling,  impulse,  will-acts,  body- 
motions,  and  strains,  but  these  would  be  retrospective 
substitutes  not  present  during  the  will.  I  must  try  to 
describe  the  ego  but  not  use  the  description  as  a  point  of 
departure  for  Epistemology."  Violet  odor  is  as  describ- 
able  as  anything  is  and  though  the  word  may  not  be 
present  while  we  are  sniffing  the  air  we  would  soon  coin 
a  word  to  represent  it.  The  violet  odor  is  certainly  an 
integral  part  of  our  conceptual  world.  If  reality  be  some- 
thing hopelessly  different  in  the  case  of  the  ego,  it  is  like- 
wise hopelessly  different  in  the  case  of  everything  else. 

Clues  to  the  Meaning  of  Subject. 

We  may  employ  as  clues  to  the  meaning  of  the  subject : 
first,  the  meaning  of  the  object;  and  second,  the  result 
of  the  controversy  over  primary  and  secondary  qualities. 

The  first  serves  as  a  clue,  because  the  content  of  the 
word-object  has  been  fairly  well  agreed  upon;  although, 
so  far  as  I  know,  there  is  no  unanimity  in  using  a  name 
to  express  this  content. 

Of  course,  in  any  knowledge,  the  subjective  part  cannot 
be  entirely  eliminated.  But,  in  memory,  we  can  fix  our 
attention  on  a  part  that  can  more  and  more  be  separated 
out  of  its  relation  in  consciousness,  out  of  its  actual  ex- 
perience, and  regarded  by  itself.  The  orange,  as  exper- 
ienced, is  really  before  me,  only  as  it  is  round  and  yellow 
and  odorous  and  resisting  in  consciousness.  But  ab- 
stracting these  qualities  I  can  still  think  of  an  orange  as 
by  itself,  independently  of  the  relation  in  consciousness. 
It  remains  because  of  its  relation  to  other  objects.  This 
object,  if  the  abstraction  be  carried  on  far  enough,  be- 
comes a  mere  form,  an  imaginary  thing  in  itself  (Ding  an 
Sich)  which  I  can  conceive  of  with  all  its  attributes  re- 
moved. This  is  the  pure  object  which  is  never  reached 
but  is  approached  as  a  limit 

In  the  same  way  a  room  full  of  chairs  is  entirely  de- 
pendent on  consciousness  and  experience  for  full  reality, 
but  by  separating  out  the  relations  in  consciousness  (the 
qualities)  we  can  think  of  the  chairs  as  objects  by  them- 

32 


selves  when  no  one  is  there  to  see  them.  We  can  think 
of  them  in  rows.  We  can  compare  them  with  other 
chairs  in  other  rooms.  We  can  reason  about  them.  We 
can  draw  pictures  of  them.  We  can  in  our  minds  re- 
arrange them.  But  to  restore  reality  again  the  relation 
in  consciousness  must  be  re-introduced. 

For  this  object,  thought  of  in  abstraction  from  the  re- 
lation in  consciousness,  the  Germans  have  been  inclined 
to  use  the  word  Yorstellung  (presentation,  concept).  In 
the  threefold  division  it  corresponds  to  intellection.  In 
some  uses  of  the  word  it  corresponds  to  the  word  knowl- 
edge, and  therefore  Groom  Robertson  wished  to  substi- 
tute the  word  intellection  for  knowledge  (Mind  O.  S.  8, 
p.  15).  The  word  reasoning  as  contrasted  with  senti- 
ments is. often  used  as  distinguishing  it. 

This  object,  we  said,  was  made  up  of  relationships 
thought  of  in  abstraction  from  the  relation  in  conscious- 
ness. The  further  the  abstraction  is  carried  the  more 
phenomenal  does  the  object  become.  Its  furthest  limit 
is  the  purely  formal  relation  of  mathematics.  Mathe- 
matics states  the  relations  which  may  hold  between  ob- 
jects no  matter  what  the  reality  be  that  consciousness 
puts  in.  The  ultimate  objects  of  mathmetics  are  points, 
positions,  absolute  abstractions,  where  the  thing  has  only 
position. 


Object 


Subject 


3P 


33 


Universal s  in  Object  World. 

An  answer  to  the  question  what  becomes  of  necessity 
and  universals  under  this  conception  of  objectivity  will 
elucidate  the  position.     The  relations  are  necessary  only 
in  that  they  are  formal.     A  line  is  necessarily  a  line  be- 
cause we  have  conceived  of  it  as  a  line.     The  statement 
that  all  geese  are  white  is  true  for  all  time.     If  a  black 
goose  should  be  discovered  we  would  have    the   choice 
either  of  refusing  to  call  it  a  goose  or  else  of  changing 
our  concept  goose.     The  forms  are  necessary.     It  is  not 
necessary    that   certain   objects   be   put   into    particular 
forms.     The  actual  mathematical  relations  into  which  we 
put  experience  are  the  result  of  a  long  struggle  for  exist- 
ence between  different  forms.     We  may  call  them  cate- 
gories, not  brought  by  the  subject,  but  by  experience  as 
a  whole.     New  experience  calls  for  new  forms.    Not  that 
the   old  forms  are  thus  proven  false,  but  inapplicable. 
Plane  measurement  was  right  and  is  right,  but  to  surfaces 
upon  the  earth  we  now  apply  spherical  measure. 

This  is  true  of  all  classifications  and  formulations 
whether  in  physics  or  in  the  doctrinal  forms  of  religion. 
The  content  of  experience  outgrows  the  particular  form. 
Enclidian  geometry  is  true  for  all  time  and  for  all  minds 
that  construct  a  plane  geometry,  Experience  must  show 
whether  stellar  orbits  are  to  put  into  its  forms  or  not.  So 
the  forms  represented  by  the  words  subject  and  object 
may  change  from  generation  to  generation.  Controversy 
must  decide  which  is  fittest  to  survive.  There  is  there- 
fore nothing  in  the  persistence  of  controversies  in  the  do- 
main of  truth  to  frighten  us.  We  must  expect  that  con- 
troversies about  the  fittest  form  will  persist  even  after 
experience  has  ceased  to  present  anything  new. 

This  view  of  the  object  world  as  made  up  of  surviving 
forms  might  be  made  of  wider  application  and  all  the 
contours  and  colors  into  which  experience  now  runs  as 
into  moulds  might  be  regarded  as  transient  forms  which 
a  still  wider  experience  will  ignore.  So  the  human  body 
itself  might  be  a  form  whose  passing  did  not  mean  ani- 

34 


hilation.  This  is  not  an  acceptance  of  the  fourth  dimen- 
sion world  view,  although  it  is  a  recognition  of  the  ap- 
parent inadequacy  of  our  present  forms  to  account  for 
the  whole  of  experience. 

The   World   of  Truth. 

Of  the  various  words  which  in  part  represent  what  is 
meant  by  object  in  the  analysis  of  consciousness,  the  one 
which  appears  best  adapted  to  sum  them  all  up,  seems  to 
be  the  word  truth. 

There  are  two  objections  to  the  word  concept;  first, 
the  word  has  been  historically  associated  with  the  meta- 
physical subject  and  thus  has  been  used  in  contrast  with 
the  material  object.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate 
the  varied  uses  of  the  word  concept : 


Object 


Object 


Subject 


o 


Subject 


Dualism. 

Object 


Identity  Philosophy. 


o 


Subject 


Will  Philosophy. 
35 


Second,  the  word  refers  to  a  single  object  and  thus  does 
not  bring  out  the  fact  that  objects  are  distinguished  as 
such  by  their  complete  relativism  inter  se.  An  object  as 
an  object  is  never  anything  by  itself  but  always  in  rela- 
tion to  other  objects.  Concept  is,  therefore,  too  concrete 
a  word.  The  one  we  select  must  be  thoroughly  abstract. 
An  object  grows  out  of  an  experience  through  an  abstract 
process  of  comparison.  An  object  acquires  a  meaning  as 
an  object  only  by  reference  to  an  object  world,  not  prim- 
arily by  contrast  with  the  subject.  Of  this  we  shall  speak 
later.  The  essential  characteristic  of  the  object  world  is 
the  relativism  independent  of  the  relation  to  the  subject. 

This  characteristic  of  complete  relativism,  the  word 
truth  is  fitted  to  express.  We  may  therefore  put  the 
world  of  truth  as  synonymous  with  the  phrase  "object 
world."  The  orange  can  be  spoken  of  as  an  object  only 
when  its  relations,  temporal,  spacial,  color,  etc.,  to  other 
objects  is  thought  of.  As  an  object  therefore  it  is  ab- 
stract and  not  concrete.  When  concreteness  or  reality  is 
given  to  any  portion  of  the  object  world  then  the  subjec- 
tive element  is  restored  and  so  far  its  objective  character 
is  taken  away,  although  practice  enables  us  to  return  at 
will  to  the  abstraction. 

The  word  truth  moreover  does  not  lead  to  a  division  of 
faculties  as  would  the  word  intellection,  yet  all  the  dis- 
tinctive characteristics  of  intellection  as  set  over  against 
feeling  are  in  it. 

As  it  includes  all  possible  relations  of  objects,  it  is 
sufficiently  broad  to  be  used  in  the  realm  of  psychology 
and  motives  and  will-acts. 

The  objection  might  be  made  that  the  word  truth 
already  includes  the  whole  of  experience  and  reality,  and 
therefore  is  too  broad,  since  it  embraces  the  feelings  and 
the  subject  also.  We  reply  that  the  word  reality  is  a 
broader  word  than  truth.  It  is  possible  always  to  rep- 
resent reality  in  terms  of  truth,  but  reality  is  more  than 
merely  true.  A  statement  that  I  fell  down,  may  be  true 

36 


or  false;  my  falling  down  is  neither  true  nor  false.  The 
word  true  is  not  applicable.  My  falling  down  is  a  real 
occurrence. 


Object 


\ 


.<** 


V 


Subject 


Primary  and  Secondary  Qualities. 

With  a  fairly  well  defined  conception  of  what  is  meant 
by  object  in  our  analysis  we  may  pass  on  to  the  second 
clue  in  finding  a  content  for  the  subject. 

Locke  discovered  that  certain  of  the  qualities  of  objects 
did  not  belong  to  the  object,  but  were  rather  to  be  put  on 
the  side  of  the  subject.  These  he  distinguished  as  the 
secondary  qualities.  Berkley  and  Hume  then  showed 
that  the  primary  qualities  were  likewise  to  be  thrown  to 
the  side  of  the  subject  and  that  there  was  no  distinction 
to  be  made  between  primary  and  secondary  qualities. 
The  object  was  thus  rapidly  being  dissipated.  Kant  tried 
to  retain  it  as  a  Ding  an  sich,  but  the  next  generation 
rejected  even  this  vestige. 

37 


The  following  diagrams  will  illustrate  the  positions  of 
Locke,  Kant  and  Fichte  : 


Object 


Object 


o 


o 


Subject 


\ 


Sutyect 


Locke 


Kant 


Object 


Subject. 


.Subject 


Fichte 


The  qualities,  therefore,  are  particularly  characteristic 
of  the  subject. 

The  World  of  Worth. 

The  qualities  especially  associated  with  the  senses  are 
color,  taste,  odor,  hardness,  smoothness,  etc.  Those  con- 
nected with  feeling  are  pain,  pleasure,  etc.  With  the 
emotions  are  associated  hatred  and  love.  With  the  whole 
world  of  subjectivity  are  associated  the  qualities  of  value 
and  worth. 


38 


Now  looking  all  these  qualities  over,  the  most  inclusive 
one,  the  one  best  suited  to  stand  for  them  all,  seems  to 
be  represented  by  the  word  worth. 

Doubtless  objections  to  the  word  come  to  the  mind  at 
once,  and  perhaps  in  time  a  happier  word  will  be  hit 
upon.  But  this  word  seems  at  least  to  lie  in  the  right 
direction. 

It  is  abstract  but  purposely  so  because  it  stands  for 
only  part  of  consciousness  or  reality,  abstracted  away. 
It  is  what  has  been  abstracted  from  the  objective  ele- 
ments. 

It  is  not  meant  to  be  the  supporter  for  the  whole  of 
experience  nor  for  the  whole  of  the  person.  It  is  not  the 
metaphysical  subject.  It  does  not  by  itself  stand  for 
reality  as  opposed  to  the  phenomenal  object  world.  I 
is  not  meant  to  be  the  synthesis  of  all  the  elements  in  con- 
sciousness. 

It  can  not  be  concrete  because  the  concrete  is  the  union 
of  both  the  subject  and  object. 

It  is  not  a  substance.  It  is  not  tangible.  The  word 
worth  is  farthest  removed  from  objective  relations.  But 
it  does  sufficiently  stand  for  the  subjective  part  in  all 
states  of  consciousness. 

We  can  never  use  the  word  worth  without  having 
reference  to  a  subject.  An  object  can  have  a  worth  only 
as  related  to  a  subject  in  consciousness.  If  ever  it  is  used 
of  one  object  in  relation  to  another,  the  second  .object  is 

39 


thereby  personified.  The  most  elaborately  constructed 
machine,  with  perfect  harmony  of  parts,  is,  by  itself, 
valueless,  and  if  ever  the  word  worth  is  used  of  anything, 
it  is  evidence  that  the  personal  or  subjective  element  has 
entered.  No  other  word  is  so  characteristic  of  the  ego,  of 
the  "I,"  of  subjects,  of  persons. 

Compare  Prof.  Ladd's  statement  (Phil,  of  Conduct  p. 
37):  "  Every  form  and  degree  of  what  men  call  either 
good  or  bad  has  reference  to  a  state  of  sentient  and 
conscious  life  and  all  higher  and  more  significant  forms 
to  the  experiences  of  a  self-conscious  life — if  conscious 
life  were  extinguished  there  would  be  no  more  good. 
What  is  good?  What  is  bad?  States  of  selves  and 
what  has  reference  to  states  of  selves." 

If  it  be  objected  that  the  word  worth  is  not  positive 
enough  because  there  is  no  agreement  as  to  what  is  valu- 
able, the  reply  is  that  that  is  just  the  reason  why  it  is 
best  suited  to  what  we  mean  by  the  subject,  inasmuch 
as  each  consciousness  has  its  own  conception  of  worth. 

But  does  it  not  exalt  too  much  the  pleasure-pain  factor, 
thus  lowering  the  dignity  of  life  to  the  plane  of  utili- 
tarianism, and  on  the  other  hand  can  the  word  worth  be 
used  for  the  subjective  part  in  such  neutral  sensations 
as  color  and  form?  In  reply  to  the  first  question  we  say 
that  the  word  worth  includes  everything  that  is  noblest 
in  life.  And  in  answer  to  the  second,  that  if  there  is 
such  a  thing  as  a  "neutral  feeling"  the  word  worth 
should  be  extended  to  include  it.  In  fact,  however,  the 
word,  though  usually  used  of  the  highest  forms  of  sub- 
jectivity, stands  for  the  essence  of  the  first  conscious  life 
when  it  is  as  yet  hardly  to  be  distinguished  from  so-called 
unconscious  reactions.  The  birth  of  consciousness  in  the 
lowest  animal  life  is  indicated  by  the  appreciation  of 
worths  and  not  by  the  feeling.  The  subjective  factor  in 
the  simplest  organism  is  not  feeling  but  worth,  and  only 
in  a  highly  developed  consciousness  are  certain  subjective 
elements  degraded  to  feelings. 

The  word  worth  is  neither  active  nor  passive.  Nor  can 
the  word  that  stands  for  the  subject  be  either  active  or 

40 


passive,  activity  and  passivity  being  words  used  of 
objective  relations.  Feeling  is  usually  thought  of  as 
passive  and  desire  as  active.  Worth  is  able  to  stand  for 
the  subjective  part  in  both.  In  desire  the  analysis  into 
subject  and  object  has  progressed  far  enough  for  the 
worth  part  to  be  singled  out  and  treated  as  an  object  by 
being  compared  with  other  worths. 

The  analysis  of  consciousness  into  worth  and  truth  em- 
braces what  seemed  to  be  the  entirely  distinct  antitheses 
of  person  and  thing  (or  ego  and  non-ego)  and  feeling  and 
thought.  This  latter  antithesis  is  as  fundamental  as  the 
former,  though  as  more  psychological  it  has  not  been  so 
prominent  in  the  great  systems.  Feeling  is  very  differ- 
ent from  the  recognition  of  relations.  "No  feeling  as 
such  or  as  felt  is  a  relation — even  a  relation  between 
feelings  is  not  itself  a  feeling  or  a  felt."  (Green  in  Mind 
O.  S.  7-28.)  "  Through  feelings  we  become  acquainted 
with  things,  but  only  by  our  thoughts  do  we  know  about 
them."  (James  Psy.  1-222.) 

The  analysis  we  have  made  accounts  for  a  phenomenon 
which  so  far  as  I  know  Wm.  Hamilton  was  the  first  to 
emphasize,  namely  that  knowledge  and  feeling — percep- 
tion and  sensation,  though  always  co-existent,  are  al\^ys 
in  the  inverse  ratio  of  each  other.  (Spencer  Psy.  2  p.  252.) 

We  may  speak  of  worth  as  a  category  applied  to  ex- 
perience and  thus  corresponding  to  the  category  of  truth, 
the  former  including  value,  feeling,  sensing,  etc.,  and  the 
latter  relationship,  and  ultimately  time-space-cause. 

The  following  diagrams  will  illustrate  the  position : 

Object  Object 


Sense-  feeling-emotion 


Subject 


Subject 

41 


The  same  diagram  illustrates  the  dualisms  in  the  hist- 
ory of  philosophy,  though  today  we  would  prefer  to 
avoid  using  the  words  internal  and  external  which  result 
from  applying  to  the  experience  of  others  a  distinction 
which  is  not  true  of  our  own  experience  nor  of  theirs. 
Matter  and  spirit  moreover  would  be  put  both  on  the  ob- 
ject side.  Cogitatio  would  be  put  in  the  center  with  an 
ego  not  further  defined  to  correspond  to  the  extensio. 


Object 


.%.- 

Vs 


Subject 


In  these  illustrations,  both  an  X  an'd  a  Y  are  necessary 
to  establish  every  point.  Even  if  we  put  Y  equals  0, 
the  zero  here  does  not  mean  nothingness  but  a  smaller 
number  than  any  we  may  give.  Zero  is  a  limit  indefin- 
itely approached  but  never  reached.  The  same  with  the 
subjective  and  objective  elements  in  consciousness.  In 
thinking  of  a  mathematical  triangle  or  of  a  chemical  atom 
the  subjective  element  is  reduced  to  zero;  in  a  pain,  on 
the  contrary,  the  objective  element  is  zero.  Of  course, 
they  are  right  who  maintain  that  pure  subject  can  never 
be  reached,  but  with  equal  right  can  we  say  that  pure 
object  can  never  be  reached  nor  pure  zero.  Now  that  the 
phenomenality  of  the  object  world  is  so  frequently  put  for- 
ward, we  may  be  more  ready  to  pay  attention  to  worths 
which  seemed  to  be  so  hopelessly  phenomenal  as  to  de- 
serve no  place  in  science  which  was  content  with  nothing 
less  than  absoluteness. 

42 


The  Ego  or  Self. 

The  ego  or  self,  which  determined  us  in  selecting  the 
words  subject  and  object  for  our  analysis,  is  a  very  com- 
plex thing.  Into  the  idea  there  enters  unity,  energy, 
worth,  and  perhaps  other  elements.  The  subjective  char- 
acteristic of  the  ego  or  self,  however,  is  not  its  unity 
(Ladd),  nor  its  energy  (James) ;  it  is  the  appreciation  of 
worths.  The  two  former  may  or  may  not  be  essential  to 
the  conception,  but  when  the  third  goes  the  self  goes. 
The  self  or  ego  as  a  whole  is  to  be  thrown  technically  to 
the  object  side.  It  is  a  concept  in  which  the  factors  of 
unity  and  force  have  been  added  to  the  worth  side  in  con- 
sciousness. 

Out  of  undifferentiated  experience,  that  is,  experience 
not  yet  become  consciousness  and  therefore  not  experience 
in  our  sense  of  the  word,  it  is  the  distinction  between  value 
and  relation,  (essentially,  logically,  and  chronologically 
primary,)  which  produces  consciousness.  This  distinction, 
in  fact,  marks  the  birth  of  consciousness.  Here  also  is 
the  beginning  of  memory.  We  may  say,  perhaps,  that 
the  transformation  of  mere  reflexes  into  consciousness, 
which  psychologically  is  due  to  memory  and  distinguishes 
the  now  from  the  then,  is  epistemologically  the  result  of 
the  distinction  between  value  and  relation.  The  now  is 
thus  inseparably  associated  with  the  subject  and  with 
the  ego. 

No  matter  how  true  may  be  the  insistence  of  our  an- 
alysis on  the  worth  side  of  life,  psychologically  it  stands 
or  falls  with  its  ability  to  account  for  the  empirical  ego 
or  self.  Although  we  do  not  deny  the  validity  of  other 
analyses,  we  are  not  content  with  showing  merely  that 
our  analysis  is  important  and  is  justified  by  experience. 
Our  claim  is  that  it  is  fundamental  and  primary  in  psy- 
chology, and  that  from  the  difference  between  a  relation 
and  a  value  is  derived  that  striking  difference  which  I 
experience  between  the  self  and  the  not- self.  We  are  far 
therefore  from  rejecting  the  ego  as  "  unrettbar."  The 
ego  must  remain  but  as  a  worth  and  not  as  a  unit  or  an 

43 


energy.  For  this  cause  do  we  go  into  the  discussions  of 
the  next  few  headings,  which  are  indeed  difficult  to  deal 
with  satisfactorily.  Our  purpose  is  to  show  that  these 
topics  can  be  as  intelligibly  discussed  from  our  stand- 
point as  from  any  other  and  in  my  opinion  better  dis- 
cussed. 

One  reason  for  the  difficulty  of  seeing  the  availability 
of  our  analysis  in  accounting  for  the  experience  of  the 
self  is  that  the  latter  seems  so  concrete ;  as  though  we 
could  pass  on  every  side  of  it  (except  one),  while  the 
epistemological  subject  is  an  abstraction  to  be  looked  at 
as  a  picture  on  a  wall,  artificial,  the  product  of  imagi 
nation.  The  self  throws  itself  at  us  like  something  hard, 
while  the  subject  in  consciousness  is  a  gossamer  web 
which  gives  way  whereever  we  try  to  seize  it.  If  our 
philosophy  has  taught  us  that  the  book  which  we  look  at 
on  the  table  is,  as  a  book,  an  abstraction  similar  in  kind 
to  the  book  which  we  think  of  with  our  eyes  closed,  this 
difficulty  will  disappear.  The  consciousness  of  self  is  the 
result  of  abstractions  and  has  many  gradations.  When 
insistently  pursued  it  scatters  out  each  side  along  the 
way,  leaving  us  to  follow  after  a  smaller  and  smaller 
thing  which  finally  becomes,  to  our  fixed  gaze,  indistin- 
guishable from  a  non-existent. 

Another  difficulty  in  seeing  the  availability  of  our  an- 
alysis in  accounting  for  the  fact  of  the  self  is  that  to 
some  the  latter  seems  necessary  as  an  agent  for  fulfilling 
the  functions  of  thinking.  Can  the  states  of  conscious- 
ness, it  is  asked,  do  the  thinking  ?  Those  who  have  been 
able  to  dismiss  the  agencies  in  physics  and  biology  should 
be  able  to  do  the  same  here. 

Still  another  difficulty  is  that  by  asserting  the  phe- 
nomenality  of  both  subject  and  object  and  yet  putting  all 
experience  into  one  of  these  two  categories,  we  resign 
any  hope  of  knowing  reality.  The  diagrams  which  we 
have  used  will,  it  is  hoped,  show  that  we  experience 
reality,  and  if  the  word  knowledge  is  used  in  a  different 
sense  from  experience,  then  we  know  only  a  part  of 
reality. 

44 


Here  the  question  may  be  raised:  "What  becomes  of 
objective  reality  under  this  view?"  This  question  de- 
serves special  consideration. 

Objective  Reality. 

Any  object  is  objectively  real  when  it  is  so  completely 
related  to  the  whole  world  of  experience  that  we  can  as- 
sert its  reality  without  taking  into  consideration  a  par- 
ticular reality  through  an  act  of  consciousness.  Of  an 
experience  or  state  of  consciousness,  the  objective  reality 
depends  on  our  ability  to  relate  it  to  the  object  world  be- 
cause of  its  persistence  in  spite  of  changed  objective  re- 
lations or  changed  senses.  The  experience  of  a  rainbow 
has  less  objective  reality  than  that  of  a  stone  because  it 
does  not  seem  to  have  a  fixed  relation  to  the  object  world. 
A  pain  has  almost  no  objective  reality  because  it  seems  to 
have  no  fixed  objective  relations  and  moreover  cannot  be 
seen,  heard,  tasted,  or  smelled.  We  may  say  that  the 
objective  reality  of  an  experience  depends  on  our  ability 
to  describe  or  define  it  in  terms  of  other  objects. 

The  word  concrete,  therefore,  though  every  experience 
and  state  of  consciousness  is  concrete,  is  also  used  of 
objects  which  are  in  manifold  relations  to  other  ob- 
jects. The  objective  reality  of  an  object  depends  on  the 
concreteness  which  it  preserves  on  account  of  its  abund- 
ant relations  to  other  objects  which  are  immediately  re- 
lated to  the  subject  through  experience,  even  though  in 
the  case  of  that  particular  object  the  subjective  factor  is 
reduced  to  zero.  So  an  unseen  planet  may  be  known  as 
objectively  real  and  some  would  be  willing  to  call  it  con- 
crete even  though  no  telescope  has  ever  detected  it.  And 
so  aragon  is  real  and  in  one  use  of  the  word,  concrete, 
though  no  sense  has  ever  sensed  it. 

It  is  in  this  significance  that  some  would  distinguish 
between  a  real  world  and  an  existent  world,  using  the 
former  term  of  the  epistemologically  real  world  where 
subject  and  object  are  united  in  consciousness  and  the 
latter  term  of  the  world,  thought  of  as  real,  independ- 
ent of  the  relation  to  the  subject.  This  latter  is  an  ab- 

45 


straction.  It  is  also  in  the  latter  sense  that  some  systems 
speak  of  progressive  reality  with  the  ultimately  real  or 
the  absolute,  as  unattainable.  A  thing  begins  to  be  real, 
upon  the  y  axis,  as  soon  as  thought  of  as  a  possible  link 
in  the  network  of  relations  which  makes  up  the  objective 
world.  With  no  break  does  it  increase  in  reality  while 
the  network  is  made  finer  and  finer  and  more  and  more 
extensive  until  that  particular  link  is  in  infinite  relat- 
ions with  every  other  link.  This  goal  can  never  be 
reached  and  the  extreme  edges  of  the  network  must  al- 
ways be  frayed,  hence  the  unattainableness  of  the  abso- 
lute. 

Rxperience  and  Consciousness. 

In  the  use  of  the  two  words  experience  and  conscious- 
ness the  division  into  the  two  categories  of  the  subject 
and  object  has  already  progressed  so  far  that  though  they 
cover  the  same  ground,  the  word  experience  has  in  mind 
the  objective  relations  and  the  word  consciousness  the 
subjective  relations.  Each  covers  the  whole  of  reality. 
Perhaps  the  following  diagram  will  illustrate  this : 


Object 


Subject 


A  representing  reality,  A1  and  A2  are  where  the  sub- 
jective factors  have  been  more  neglected,  and  AI  and  A2 
where  the  objective  factors.  All  five  represent  the  same 
original  experience  or  state  of  consciousness,  the  word  ex- 
perience being  represented  by  the  dark  portions  and  the 
consciousness  by  the  light  portions. 

46 


When  psychology  claims  to  deal  with  consciousness,  it 
can  claim  to  cover  every  fact  of  experience  and  is  there- 
fore the  all  embracing  science.  On  the  other  hand  the 
science  of  experience  (experimental  science)  covers  every 
fact  and  subordinates  psychology  to  a  branch  of  itself 
and  works  out  a  psychology  without  consciousness,  con- 
sciousness being  an  accidental  spectator.  Hence  has  re- 
sulted the  problem  of  psycho-physical  parallelism,  with 
the  result  that  pyschology  must  be  put  either  on  one  side 
or  the  other  or  divided  into  two  distinct  sciences.  The 
problem  is  overcome  when  we  learn  that  both  conscious- 
ness and  experience  are  already  abstractions  covering  the 
same  reality.  As  fast  as  consciousness  is  reduced  to  ex- 
perience, we  can  speak  of  science.  Historically  and  log- 
ically, therefore,  we  limit  the  term  psychology  to  that 
borderland  where  the  diremption  between  subject  and 
object  has  not  been  completely  carried  out.  Psychology 
has  to  deal  with  that  part  of  the  field  of  experience  or 
consciousness  where  those  elements  which  have  the  least 
objectivity,  and  the  most  subjectivity  are  being  reduced  to 
objective  relations.  Psychology,  therefore,  does  not  deal 
with  the  subject  as  such. 

Two  Tests  of  Reality. 

There  are  then  two  tests  of  reality,  the  fact  of  the  re- 
lation to  an  object  and  the  fact  of  a  relation  to  a  subject, 
—two  ways  of  controlling,  establishing,  and  imparting 
reality  (experience  or  consciousness  itself  being  not  im- 
partable).  Anything,  for  instance  the  unseen  planet  Nep- 
tune, that  is  in  the  objective  relation,  is  real  and  there- 
fore can  be  conceivably  put  into  the  subjective  relation  so 
as  to  give  it  full  or  epistemological  reality.  Anything 
that  is  in  the  subjective  relation  like  a  pain  is  also  real 
and  can  conceivably  be  put  in  the  objective  relations  so 
as  to  be  given  full  or  epistemological  reality. f 

Now  the  words  truth  and  worth  represent  the  gradua- 
tion of  Epistemology  out  of  its  own  realm,  where  the 

f  NOTE— This  is  a  much  more  significant  than  Hegel's  (Phil,  of  Law,  Pre- 
face) :  "What  is  reasonable  is  actual  and  what  is  actual  is  reasonable." 

47 


words  subject  and  object  might  be  sufficient,  into  the 
larger  world  of  thought  and  life.  We  are  therefore  able 
to  assert  the  reciprocity  between  truth  and  value,  so  that 
though  they  are  independent  variables,  they  are  ulti- 
mately united  in  a  higher  monism,  corresponding  in  the 
universe  as  a  whole  to  the  undivided  real  which  is  the  start- 
ing point  of  epistemology.  Just  as  we  asserted  that  what 
ever  had  objective  relations  therefore  had  subjective  also, 
and  whatever  had  subjective  relations  had  objective  also, 
so  whatever  is  true,  has  a  worth  and  (a  point  usually 
overlooked),  whatever  has  a  value  is  proportionately  real 
and  therefore  is  true. 

Worth  as  a  Test  of  Reality. 

The  establishing  of  this  last  point  at  once  gives  to  Re- 
ligion the  basis  in  epistemology  which  it  has  seemed  to 
lack.  Religious  positions  are  not  held  because  of  their 
truth — for  Geometry  is  true  yet  not  a  religion — but  they 
are  held  because  of  their  value.  We  leave  this  thus 
stated  dogmatically  because  this  is  not  the  place  to  go 
into  a  historical  and  analytical  proof  of  the  statement. 

Suffice  it  to  say  that  when  worth  is  identified  with  the 
subjective  element,  with  the  person,  the  spirit-world  of 
religion  and  the  world  of  love  of  Christianity,  become 
identified  with  the  worth  element  in  life  and  with  the 
subject  of  Epistemology. 

Looking  at  a  fact  common  sense  says  this  has  a  value 
for  me  and  it  concludes  that  this  is  therefore  true.  And 
common  sense  is  practically  right.  The  truth  may  be 
grievously  mixed  up  with  error,  but  somewhere  there  is 
truth  and  when  many  agree  in  finding  a  value,  of  course 
so  much  more  certain  may  we  be  that  there  is  an  object- 
ive correlative  somewhere.  If  it  be  a  hallucination  it  is 
a  relation  to  a  former  object. 

Again  and  again  have  scientists  taken  up  supposed 
realities  which  appeal  to  men  as  having  great  worth  and 
have  demonstrated  them  untrue  and  have  been  surprised 
to  see  the  position  accepted  as  real  in  spite  of  their  de- 
monstrations. Common  sense  very  rightly  says,  "May 

48 


not  your  demonstration  be  just  as  faulty  as  my  estimate 
of  worth." 

Only  after  constructive  criticism,  following  in  the  wake 
of  destructive  criticism,  has  pointed  out  the  new  value 
will  common  sense  forsake  the  old  position.  Be  the 
proof  never  so  clear,  reasoning  has  never  yet  been  able  to 
overthrow  a  single  religious  tenet ;  the  only  way  to  re- 
move a  religious  position — and  a  sure  way  it  is — is  to 
show  its  lack  of  value. 

If  we  ask  which  religion  has  gained  an  influence,  hist- 
ory will  answer,  "that  which  has  established  the  reality 
of  its  positions  by  most  clearly  showing  their  worth ;  but 
where  a  religion  has  tried  to  establish  the  reality  of  its 
positions  principally  through  their  truth,  it  has  so  far 
ceased  to  have  a  religious  influence."  It  has  ceased  so 
far  to  be  a  religion  and  has  become  a  science.  We  can 
also  account  for  a  seeming  paradox  justified  by  exper- 
ience ;  namely,  that  that  faith  is  the  most  religious  which 
is  against  reason  (Kierkegaard,  Einiibung  im  Christen- 
thum.)  This  is  because  such  a  faith  must  have  a  great 
value. 

With  these  two  tests  the  advance  into  the  realm  of 
reality  is  an  advance  on  two  legs,  worth  bringing  truth 
into  new  fields  and  truth  leading  the  way  to  new  worths. 
Instances  of  the  latter  are  found  in  our  every  day  life. 
Of  the  former  we  may  cite  as  instances  the  doctrines  of 
free-will,  of  immortality,  and  of  divine  sonship  where 
truth  has  gained  new  insight  into  psychology,  cosmology 
and  into  the  conception  of  God,  because  men  refused  to 
give  these  doctrines  up  when  they  were  "  proven  untrue." 
Many  a  man  who  felt  the  hopelessness  of  his  life,  if  his 
religious  creed  were  to  be  given  up,  has  been  forced  to 
meditate  more  profoundly  and  has  found  truth  where  to 
the  superficial  view  there  seemed  only  error. 

The  Will. 

The  question  must  already  have  arisen,  what  becomes 
of  the  will  under  this  analysis.  The  answer  will  be 
found  aloiig  the  line  of  argument  of  kt  panpsychistic  " 

49 


Monism.  The  will  is  an  energy  like  electricity,  heat  and 
other  energies.  It  is  distinctly  a  spiritual  energy.  We 
do  not  argue  whether  the  idea  of  energy  is  obtained  from 
contemplating  the  object  world  or  is  a  feeling  belonging 
peculiarly  to  the  subject  and  by  it  projected  into  object- 
ive relations.  We  merely  take  as  a  fact  the  idea  of 
energy  and  ask  whether  it  falls  naturally  to  the  side  of 
the  object  or  the  subject,  when  we  try  to  have  that  an- 
alysis do  justice  to  the  whole  of  consciousness.  We  do 
not  question  the  privilege  of  any  one  to  take  the  two 
words,  subject  and  object,  and  to  put  relation,  for  in- 
stance, for  the  latter,  and  energy  for  the  former.  We 
only  say  that  then  the  feeling  part,  the  worth  part 
in  consciousness,  has  not  been  recognized,  and  that  we 
are  in  materialism  again — its  grossness  gone  and  subli- 
mated into  energy  but  nevertheless  materialism.  We 
have,  with  such  an  analysis,  no  subject  that  can  stand  as 
such  in  a  state  of  consciousness.  Such  an  assignment  of 
roles  to  subject  and  object  does  not  come  from  Epistemol- 
ogy  but  from  Cosmology.  In  Cosmology  the  will  is  the 
most  important  factor.  The  impelling  thing  in  life  is  the 
pressure  of  the  will  to  exert  itself.  It  often  appears  that 
men  do  not  act  because  of  the  pleasure  or  reward,  but  be- 
cause the  pleasure  offers  a  mode  of  greater  life,  because 
it  is  a  greater  vent  to  power.  The  doctrine  of  energism 
deserves  the  important  place  it  has  assumed  in  our  think- 
ing. Above  the  gravity  energies,  above  the  physical  and 
chemical  energies,  stands  in  importance  the  will  energy. 
Yet  not  so  different  from  them  as  some  have  thought. 
Through  blind  passions  and  through  impulses  it  by  de- 
grees grades  over  into  them.  It  partakes  of  their  determ- 
inism, just  as  the  doughtiest  of  its  champions  has  granted. 
In  what  point  then  does  it  differ  from  them  ?  In  our 
postulating  of  it  a  worth  side,  a  subject  side,  not  re- 
vealed to  us  directly  but  indirectly  in  accounting  for 
its  appearance.  A  will  or  a  person  is  not  an  epistemolog- 
ical  subject,  but  an  object  which  reflection  shows  us  must 
have  an  independent  worth.  Therefore,  we  may  say  that 
it  is  not  a  subject  but  a  subject  object  appearing  to  us 

50 


primarily  as  an  object  and  secondarily  as  a  subject. 
The  full  recognition  of  the  subjective  part  or  the  inde- 
pendent worth  of  Wills  as  distinct  from  Energies  was  in- 
troduced comparatively  late  into  human  thought,  through 
the  command,  "Love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself."  This 
means  to  feel  the  worth  of  your  neighbor  as  you  feel  that 
of  self. 

In  giving  an  account  of  will  we  have  had  in  mind  what 
seemed  to  be  the  most  common  use.  So  widely  used  a 
word  has  many  shades  of  meaning.  Sometimes  will 
power  denotes  intellectual  concentration  and  is  closely 
akin  to  memory.  In  fact,  memory  and  a  sense  of  worths 
are  sufficient  to  give  anyone  will-power. 

Sometimes  the  will  is  differentiated  from  other  energies 
by  the  phrase  "  final-cause,"  and  at  the  same  time  an 
element  of  values  is  introduced.  What  actually  happens 
in  such  cases  is  that  a  conception  of  a  value  is  present  as 
an  efficient  cause.  The  fact  that  the  achievement  is  in 
the  future  does  not  justify  any  real  distinction  in  a  final 
cause.  Final  causes  introduce  confusion  rather  than 
clearness.  The  word  cause  or  the  phrase  efficient  cause  is 
sufficient  to  cover  the  laws  of  relations  of  wills,  and  the 
worth  element  is  already  present  in  the  conception.  It 
cannot  be  introduced  by  any  futurity. 

Freedom  of  Will. 

With  the  will  as  an  object  in  the  world  of  necessity, 
the  question  arises  as  to  the  freedom  of  the  will. 

The  universality  of  the  laws  of  the  object  world  attach 
to  the  same  degree  to  the  will  which  is  an  object.  To 
reach  the  conception  of  contingency  we  must  revert  to 
what  has  been  already  said  in  regard  to  Universals.  Any 
law  which  we  state  as  universally  valid,  is  universally 
valid  until  we  decide  to  modify  the  content  of  either  the 
subject  or  the  predicate.  Dry  powder  touched  by 
fire  explodes,  we  say,  because  if  it  does  not,  it  isn't 
powder.  A  single  instance  creates  a  law.  Any  object, 
powder  for  instance,  is  an  abstraction  quite  as  much  as 
the  law ;  there  is  therefore  nothing  surprising  in  objects 

51 


or  abstractions  obeying  abstract  rules.  New  experiences 
produce  new  objects  and  call  for  new  laws.  In  one  sense 
laws  control  objects  and  have  been  valid  from  eternity,  in 
another  sense  experience  produces  the  laws.  Here,  then, 
we  have  given  the  world  of  unchangeable  law,  but  in  the 
increase  of  experience  is  introduced  the  element  of  con- 
tingency into  the  world  because  new  laws  are  called  into 
being. 

So  in  one  sense  the  will  is  strictly  determined  by  mo- 
tives. On  the  other  hand,  new  states  of  consciousness  aud 
new  worths  introduce  contingency.  We  can  explain 
fairly  well  why  we  acted  in  the  past,  but  not  how  we  will 
act  in  the  future.  This  is  because  an  experience  in  the 
future,  not  yet  become  real,  cannot  be  put  into  the  cate- 
gories of  subject  and  object,  and  therefore  we  do  not  know 
its  law  or  its  worth.  The  worth  of  the  particular  experience 
does  not  preceed  that  experience.  Only  after  an  exper- 
ience has  come  do  we  learn  its  worth. 

Worth  as  subject  is  therefore  not  a  motive ;  motives 
are  previous  experiences  where  the  experience  as  a  whole 
is  looked  at  as  an  object  or  concept  by  itself.  This  meets 
the  contention  that  because  the  pleasure  accompanies  and 
does  not  precede  the  act,  pleasure  cannot  be  a  motive. 

Spirit  and   Matter. 

The  same  reasoning  which  we  used  in  regard  to  the  will 
as  an  independent  worth  answers  the  query  as  to  what 
becomes  of  the  spirit  with  this  entirely  epistemological 
view  of  the  subject. 

Our  analysis  enables  us  to  give  to  the  traditional  dis- 
tinction between  spirit  and  matter  a  meaning  without 
introducing  any  such  gulf  as  is  usually  implied.  Mattel- 
being  energy  and  all  energy  being  thrown  to  the  object 
side,  a  spirit  is  an  energy  in  which  I  postulate,  a  pos- 
teriori^ an  independent  worth  or  subject,  independent 
because  not  depending  on  the  relation  to  my  subject. 
This  is  a  confession  that  our  knowledge  of  other  selves  is 
not  immediate  and  a  priori,  but  no  more  is  my  knowl- 
edge of  myself.  In  fact  all  knowledge  is  the  result  of 

52 


analysis.  It  is  a  matter  of  opinion  or  of  evidence  just 
how  far  we  are  to  go  in  applying  the  term  spirit  to  the 
energies  which  we  meet. 

There  is  no  strict  line  of  demarcation  to  be  drawn  be- 
tween the  spirit-sciences  and  the  nature- sciences  although 
they  may  be  distinguished.  The  former  take  the  worths 
into  consideration,  the  latter  as  far  as  possible  eliminate 
the  worth  element.  History,  for  instance,  may  be  taken 
up  from  either  standpoint.  The  relative  importance  of  the 
study  of  history  from  the  standpoint  of  worths  has,  very 
naturally  perhaps,  been  underestimated.  The  study  of 
history  from  the  scientific  standpoint  explains  the  past 
and  to  a  small  extent  gives  an  insight  into  the  future.  It 
provides  maxims.  When  we  require  counsel  and  leader- 
ship, however,  he  who  has  appreciated  the  worths  in 
history,  possesses  that  subtle  prophetic  power  which 
seems  like  inspiration  or  intuition.  The  mere  study  of 
past  relations  and  past  causes  produces  incompetent  di- 
rectors of  affairs  because  circumstances  are  never  the  same. 
New  rights  are  growing  all  the  time.  The  control  of  af- 
fairs is  to  be  entrusted  to  him  who  through  his  broad  ap- 
preciation of  worths  is  able  to  appreciate  new  worths  be- 
fore enough  is  known  about  them  for  science  to  work  out 
the  laws  of  their  relations.  Very  silly  does  the  develop- 
ment of  events  make  the  advice  seem  of  him  who  has 
looked  on  history  only  externally,  studying  its  laws  but 
not  pulsing  with  its  heart.  And  how  marvellous  seems 
the  intuition  of  him  who  has  forefelt  his  fellow  men.  He 
becomes  the  Saviour. 

Ethical   Laws. 

It  is  this  fact  of  new  worths  which  justifies  the  recog- 
nition of  new  rights,  new  ethical  laws  and  the  passing  of 
old  ones.  The  old  rights  and  the  old  laws  are  as  valid 
for  the  old  circumstances  as  ever.  They  were  and  are 
universals,  only  that  the  laws  of  the  sulphates  do  not 
apply  to  the  paraphine  series.  If  a  thing  is  right  once  it 
must  be  for  all  time.  New  circumstances,  however,  bring 
into  being  new  rights  which  supplant  the  old  ones, 

53 


although  they  do  not  prove  them  wrong.  In  a  sense, 
therefore,  every  age  and  country  and  every  individual 
has  new  ethical  laws  according  to  the  varation  of  worths. 
The  varations  are  not  different  in  kind  nor  very  different 
in  degree  from  the  varations  in  the  perception  of  the 
sense  objects. 

One  of  the  favorite  arguments  against  the  emphasis  on 
values  has  been  the  lack  of  agreement  introduced  into 
ethics.  There  seems  to  be  no  basis  for  imparting 
conviction  and  certainty.  In  practice,  however,  it  is 
hard  to  compel  agreement  as  to  whether  a  given  ball  is 
exactly  spherical  in  shape.  In  the  world  of  worths  we 
have  canons  and  rules  that  may  be  applied.  The  disagree- 
ment comes  in  deciding  whether  they  apply  to  the  given 
circumstances.  Absolute  truth  has  not  been  reached,  nor 
absolute  worth.  The  categorical  imperative  either  in 
logic  or  ethics,  gives  only  what  I  conceive  to  be  right 
with  hope  for  more  light  later.  The  parallel  uses  of  the 
word  right  in  its  two  meanings,  ethical  and  logical,  the 
one  in  line  with  the  most  worth  and  the  other  in  line  with 
the  greatest  truth,  are  not  so  very  different. 

In  the  sphere  of  Ethics  and  of  Practical  philosophy  in 
general,  we  stand  on  a  better  epistemological  basis  when 
we  use  as  the  characteristic  word  the  word  worth  rather 
than  the  word  ought.  The  distinction  between  the  world 
that  is  and  the  world  that  ought  to  be  has  become  quite 
current.  Prof.  Sidgwick's  posthumous  work,  "Philosophy, 
its  scope  and  relations,"  is  an  attempt  to  win  a  place  for 
a  science  of  "  what  ought  to  be."  The  obvious  answer 
to  such  an  attempt  is  :  "  Everything  that  is,  ought  to  be. ' ' 
In  the  appendix  to  Lecture  2  he  confesses  the  failure  to 
articulate  the  two.  In  giving  his  reasons  for  not  treat- 
ing of  the  relations  of  philosophy  to  religion  he  says, 
"  In  the  first  place  I  may  say  that  it  was  not  due  to  any 
desire  to  depreciate  the  importance  of  theology  or  to 
leave  it  on  one  side.  On  the  contrary,  as  I  have  tried  to 
indicate,  the  fundamental  question  to  which  theology 
gives  an  answer — as  to  the  relation  of  what  is,  to  what 
ought  to  be — represents  in  my  view  the  final  and  most 

54 


important  task  of  philosophy — I  was  impressed  with  the 
difficulty  either  of  separating  it"  (the  common  element 
of  religious  thought)  "from  the  historical  element  with 
which  it  is  combined  in  current  rationalistic  theologies, 
or  if  I  introduced  it  along  with  this  historical  element, 
of  giving  any  statement  of  it  that  would  claim  to  rank- 
in  respect  of  consensus  of  experts — with  the  positive 
sciences.  I  by  no  means  say  that  there  should  not  be 
made  a  serious  attempt  to  overcome  this  difficulty ;  but 
I  think  it  must  be  made  in  the  first  instance  by  theo- 
logians." 

After  all,  ethics  and  religion  find  no  sufficient  basis  in 
will  because  no  one  ever  did  anything  that  he  did  not 
wish  to  do;  nor  in  Kant's  doing  a  thing  against  desire, 
for  that  is  an  impossibility ;  nor  in  a  categorical  impera- 
tive, for  this  requires  a  further  basing  in  the  tempera- 
ment and  personality;  nor  in  the  world  that  ought  to  be. 
"  A  science  of  ethics  begins  only  when  it  is  seen  that 
men's  actions  are  consciously  directed  towards  or  un- 
consciously terminate  in  some  one  of  the  several  forms  of 
"the  Good."  (Prof.  Ladd,  Phil,  of  Conduct,  p.  41.) 

Mental  and  Physical, 

Furthermore  our  analysis  does  justice  to  the  facts 
which  gave  rise  to  the  dualism  between  the  mental  and 
the  physical,  without  however  introducing  any  onto- 
logical  dualism. 


Subjective  x 


55 


Two  senses  in  which  the  word  mental  is  used  must  be 
here  distinguished.  First,  in  the  logical  sense,  like 
intellect,  set  over  against  the  experiences  where  feeling 
enters  in,  it  is  used  of  concepts,  and  therefore  is  thrown 
further  over  to  the  object  axis  than  is  the  physical. 

Second,  as  a  result  of  an  ontological  dualism  already 
carried  out,  where  an  inner  world  is  contrasted  with  an 
outer,  the  word  mental  is  used  for  the  former.  Here  it 
seems  to  correspond  to  psychic.  As  this  brings  it  very 
close  to  the  feelings  the  mental  seems  to  be  an  extra 
layer,  if  we  might  so  imagine  it,  laid  on  top  of  the 
physical  in  the  illustration  above,  extending  from  the 
feelings  to  the  concepts  (compare  page  35).  This  use  of 
the  word  mental  as  characterizing  an  inner  world  set  over 
against  the  outer  world  we  must  reject  as  leading  to  con- 
fusion. If  it  is  used  as  synonymous  with  psychic  or  con- 
scious, covering  the  whole  of  experience  but  with  special 
regard  to  the  epistemolgical  subject  or  worth  of  the 
experience,  there  is  no  objection  save  that  this  must  be 
recognized  as  different  from  the  conceptual  world  and 
must  not  lead  us  into  the  old  dualism  of  cogitatio  and 
extensio. 

If  we  take  cogitatio  as  our  starting  point  and  reach  as  a 
conclusion  "therefore  I  am,"  we  have  not  given  a  basis  for 
"it  is."  We  are  solipsists.  If  we  wish  to  add  this 
latter  element  we  cannot  retain  the  "being"  element  in 
either,  and  therefore  out  of  "  I  think,"  our  conclusion  is 
"  therefore  I  and  it."  The  "  being  "  element  or  element 
of  existence  calls  for  another  antithesis,  that  of  feeling 
and  value.  Accordingly  from  "I  am  thinking,"  "an 
existent  and  a  value  "  is  the  conclusion.  In  the  second 
antithesis  the  I  and  it  also  find  a  meaning,  and  the  cor- 
rected syllogism  would  be,  "I  think  therefore  I  as  value 
and  it  as  being."  The  existence  of  the  ego  is  derived  a 
posteriori  and  only  a  posteriori  are  we  justified  in  identi- 
fying the  ego  represented  by  our  body  with  the  subject 
of  the  epistemological  analysis.  Probably  the  process  is 
not  very  different  from  the  way  in  which  the  eye  is 
identified  with  our  sensing  of  light.  A  fixed  head  with- 

56 


out  the  powers  of  motion  would  not  know  whether  it  saw 
with  its  eyes  or  its  ears,  and  the  question  would  never 
occur  to  it. 

The  principal  cleavage  is  not  between  the  mental  or 
psychic  and  the  physical,  but  between  the  world  of  rela- 
tion and  the  world  of  value.  Windelband's  fundamental 
distinction  between  the  idio-thetic  and  the  nomo-thetic 
sciences  comes  to  our  minds  here. 

Nominalism  and  Realism. 


All  objectitication  is  abstraction  and  all  objective  reality 
is  also  abstraction,  so  that  a  name  differs  from  an  object 
only  in  the  extent  to  which  the  abstraction  has  been  car- 
ried towards  the  object-axis. 


Object 


^ 


Subjt 


This  is  the  same  solution  as  that  presented  by  concep- 
tualism,  but  there  had  always  seemed  to  remain  lurking 
a  distinction  between  a  concept  and  an  object  which  was 
not  accounted  for.  The  concept  stove  is  a  real  object, 
therefore  real  in  the  same  way  that  the  concept  my 
kitchen  stove  is  real.  Every  object  stands  apart  by  itself 
because  of  a  process  of  abstraction  and  the  general  term 
is  as  objectively  real  as  the  particular.  The  concept  my 
kitchen  stove  is  likewise  a  universal  as  much  as  any  gen- 

57 


eral  idea  and  its  relations  will  be  always  valid,  the  only 
question  being  whether  any  particular  experience  is  to  be 
brought  under  its  category. 

The  Classification  of  Sciences. 

The  difficulties  that  have  arisen  in  the  classification  of 
sciences  have  not  been  so  much  in  the  actual  ordering  of 
them  as  in  the  reasons  for  the  ordering.  Psychology  and 
logic  have  presented  the  principal  difficulties  as  to  place. 

Our  analysis  overcomes  the  inherent  contradiction  in 
Spencer's  system,  where  the  whole  progress  was  from  ab- 
stract to  concrete,  while  the  progress  in  each  science  was 
from  concrete  to  abstract,  and  it  reconciles  this  system 
with  the  "  hierarchy  "  of  Comte's  and  the  more  cumber- 
some classifications  of  Wundt,  Grasserie,  and  Trivero. 

Ofyect 


pleasure-pain  art  religion 

—    Subject 


value  worth 


The  classification  is  linear  with  the  exception  of  phil- 
osophy and  theology  which  from  opposite  directions  ad- 

58 


vance  toward  the  same  unity.  With  our  conception  of 
objectivity,  logic  finds  its  place  among  the  objective 
sciences  with  mathematics,  to  which  it  can  indeed  be  re- 
duced. For  instance,  trees  +  other  plants  =  all  plants; 
the  poplar  -|-  other  trees  =  all  trees ;  hence  the  poplar  + 
other  trees  +  other  plants  ==  all  plants. 

Sociology  would  be  divided  between  anthropology, 
folk-psychology  and  ethics.  Epistemology,  used  of  a 
particular  part  oftentimes  included  in  the  word  psychol- 
ogy, comes  at  the  very  point  where  experience  is  analyzed 
into  truth  and  worth. 

In  the  diagram,  the  places  assigned  indicate  rather  the 
directions  and  the  comparative  places,  than  absolute 
places.  Quality,  for  instance,  continues  with  diminish- 
ing presence  clear  to  the  object  axis. 

We  reject  the  classification  into  Naturwissenschaften 
and  Geistewissenschaften,  because  it  has  no  epistemolog- 
ical  basis  and  moreover  leads  to  impossible  juxtapositions 
and  separations.  Compare  Wundt's  Einleitung  in  die 
Philosophic. 

THE  BEARING  OP  OUR  ANALYSIS  ON  THE  PROBLEMS 
OF  RELIGION. 

An  analysis  can  claim  a  right  to  attention  in  proportion 
to  the  number  and  range  of  the  facts  for  which  it  provides 
an  account.  If  we  find  our  analysis  into  subject  and 
object,  into  worth  and  truth,  serving  as  a  key  for  the 
solution  of  difficulties  and  contradictions,  we  shall  be 
more  certain  that  we  are  proceeeding  along  the  right 
lines.  Some  of  these  problems  which  come  up  in  phil- 
osophy we  have  spoken  of.  Although  this  paper  makes 
its  appeal  to  the  philosophical  reader,  it  may  not  be  out 
of  place  to  indicate  the  bearing  of  this  analysis  on  some 
of  the  problems  of  religion. 

It  articulates  religion  and  philosophy  and  provides  the 
former  with  an  epistemological  basis  as  firm  as  is  that  of 
the  latter. 

59 


Similarly  it  furnishes  a  basis  in  psychology  for  the 
Ritschlian  contentions  in  behalf  of  value- judgments  and 
frees  them  from  the  accusations  of  requiring  two  kinds 
of  truth. 

It  provides  a  theoretical  conception  of  God,  one  rea- 
soned out,  which  can  be  of  influence  in  the  practical  world 
as  well  as  in  the  theoretical  world. 

Christianity  becomes  truly  Christo-centric  which  no 
other  psychological  system  has  ever  made  it  This  is  a 
matter  of  supreme  importance  to  those  who  are  interested 
in  the  betterment  of  Society. 

To  make  the  appeal  to  men  as  children  of  worth  will 
serve  as  a  stepping  stone  to  show  them  that  they  are 
children  of  God.  The  latter  phrase  by  itself  usually 
means  very  little. 

To  realize  one's  self,  one's  own  reality,  has  been  identi- 
fied with  becoming  religious,  and  rightly  because  it  is 
feeling  one's  worth  as  well  as  one's  objective  relations. 

Save  where  values  are  found  in  the  elements  of  con- 
sciousness, attempts  to  bolster  up  the  nobility  of  life 
must  always  seem  weak. 

Religion  becomes  empirical,  worked  out  by  experience, 
dependent  on  experience,  and  not  imposed  from  the  out- 
side. It  becomes  positivistic. 

Our  analysis  turns  the  attention  of  religion  from  the 
puzzles  to  the  practical  part. 

It  justifies  the  use  of  the  word  faith,  where  faith  means 
to  feel  the  worth  of.  This  has  always  been  the  real  dis- 
tinction between  faith  and  belief,  belief  referring  to  the 
intellectual  apprehension.  It  is  faith  in  Christ,  the  sense 
of  the  worth  of  him  to  my  life  and  the  life  of  those 
around  me  which  propagates  the  Gospel.  The  belief  his 
ojective  relations  is  from  the  religious  standpoint  a  sec- 
ondary consideration.  To  one  who  feels  the  worth,  the 
moving  of  mountains  becomes  a  possible  thing.  This  in- 
terpretation of  faith  shows  how  it  may  be  central  in  the 
same  religion  which  takes  love  as  its  central  principle,  the 
basal  idea  in  each  word  is,  to  feel  the  worth  of. 

60 


A  creed  becomes  a  statement,  not  of  what  one  believes, 
but  of  what  one  values,  and  the  latter  is  the  true  test  of 
character.  Tests  of  creeds,  like  that  given  by  Newman 
in  his  Grammar  of  Assent,  viz.,  "their  vitality,  their 
coherence  and  their  fruitfulness, "  become  valid,  and  all 
similar  defences  of  a  religion  from  its  effects  receive  a 
scientific  justification;  for  instance,  Balfour's  "need" 
as  a  justification  for  religious  belief.  It  is  in  the  same 
way  that  in  experimentation  it  is  the  "need"  which 
causes  us,  in  order  to  account  for  certain  phenomena,  to 
postulate  and  to  accept  the  reality  of  substances  which 
no  one  has  ever  touched  or  tasted.  With  the  need  in- 
creases the  reality. 

Moreover,  the  phenomena  presented  by  the  so-called 
psychology  of  religion  are  less  perplexing.  The  religious 
sense  increases  with  increased  faculty  for  discriminating 
and  feeling  values.  An  emotional  temperament  accord- 
ingly is  especially  open  to  religious  experiences.  The 
objectifying  tendency  which  naturally  detracts  from  the 
intensity  of  the  religious  experience,  often  restores  the 
intensity  by  the  keener  discrimination  which  it  affords. 
The  intellectual  power  of  the  mind  is  not  the  only 
measure  of  the  power  for  experience,  and  it  sometimes 
happens  that  mental  weakness  may  be  accompanied  by 
an  exuberance  of  religious  feeling. 

The  questions  which  arise  from  the  study  of  the  his- 
tory of  religions  also  fall  into  line.  What  seem  to  be  in- 
dependent approaches  to  religion  through  poetic  mythol- 
ogy, through  selfish  propitiation  and  through  the  in- 
creasing ethical  sense  have  their  common  root  in  our  dis- 
tinction between  the  subject  and  object. 

A  miracle  may  then  be  defined  as  an  evidence  that  there 
is  a  purpose  in  the  universe.  The  supernatural  is  the 
personality,  or  independent  worth,  or  the  subject  in  the 
world. 

Pessimism  is  refuted  at  its  very  source,  for,  as  a  misan- 
thrope is  one  who  has  too  high  an  estimate  of  man,  so  a 
pessimist  has  an  idea  of  a  value  in  existence  not  justified 
by  the  objective  relations  of  experience. 

61 


CONCLUSION  AND  SUMMARY. 

I  am  conscious  of  the  sketchy  character  of  my  treat- 
ment of  oar  subject.  Many  of  the  difficulties  that  arose 
have  not  been  satisfactorily  met,  and  there  are  some  dif- 
ficulties to  which  I  have  not  even  dared  to  refer.  All 
that  I  venture  to  hope  is  that  it  is  a  step  in  the  right  di- 
rection. Even  if  I  have  not  found  the  final  place  of  values 
the  treatment  will  not  be  in  vain,  provided  it  serves  to 
cast  a  vote,  as  it  were,  by  a  show  of  hands,  in  behalf  of  a 
recognition  by  philosophy  of  worths.  Perhaps  some  one 
better  fitted  and  better  able  may  be  stimulated  by  the 
very  failures  to  establish  a  more  worthy  place  for  values 
and  to  articulate  better  our  every  day  life  and  wants,  to 
the  systems  of  thought. 

By  way  of  summary,  I  will  indicate  what  I  consider 
the  most  important  points  of  the  essay : 

First,  the  attempt  it  makes  to  treat  the  subject  of 
values  psychologically. 

Second,  the  basis  in  psychology  which  it  provides  for 
Christianity. 

Third,  the  place  it  gives  to  value  as  a  determining  factor 
in  reality. 

Fourth,  the  contribution  it  makes  to  psychology  and 
epistemology. 

Fifth,  the  type  of  mathematical  anylysis  adopted  which 
fully  represents  both  likeness  and  unlikeness,  and  keeps 
that  which  we  are  analyzing  from  appearing  as  a  phe- 
nomenon made  up  of  two  reals. 

Sixth,  the  clear  field  it  gives  to  truth. 

And  seventh,  the  basis  it  affords  for  a  classification  of 
sciences. 


YC  30598 


